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ABSTRACT
Multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) is one of the most widely used decision
methodologies in the sciences, business, and engineering worlds. MCDM methods aim at
improving the quality of decisions by making the process more explicit, rational, and
efficient. One controversial problem is that some well-known MCDM methods, like the
additive AHP methods and the ELECTRE II and III methods, may cause some types of
rank reversal problems. Rank reversal means that the ranking between two alternatives
might be reversed after some variation occurs to the decision problem, like adding a new
alternative, dropping an old alternative or replacing a non-optimal alternative by a worse
one etc. Usually such a rank reversal is undesirable for decision-making problems. If a
method does allow it to happen, the validity of the method could be questioned. However,
some recent studies indicate that rank reversals could also happen because of people’s
rational preference reversal which may be caused by their emotional feelings, like regret
and rejoicing.
Since regret and rejoicing may play a pivotal role in evaluating alternatives in
MCDM problems, sometimes the decision maker (DM) may want to anticipate these
emotional feelings and consider them in the decision-making process. Most of the regret
models in the literature use continuous functions to measure this emotional factor. This
dissertation proposes to use an approach based on a linguistic scale and pairwise
comparisons to measure a DM’s anticipated regret and rejoicing feelings. The approach is
shown to exhibit some key advantages over existing approaches. Next a multiplicative
MCDM model is adopted to aggregate the alternatives’ associated regret and rejoicing
values with their performance values to get their final priorities and then rank them. A
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simulated numerical example is used to illustrate the process of the proposed method.
Some sensitivity analyses which aim at examining how changes of regret and rejoicing
values might affect the ranking results of the decision problems are also developed. Then
a fuzzy version of the new method is introduced and illustrated by a numerical example.
Finally, some concluding remarks are made. Ranking intransitivity and some other issues
about the proposed method are analyzed too.
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CHAPTER 1. PRELIMIARY PROBLEM DESCRIPTIO
Making all kinds of decisions is an indispensable part of our lives. From the
ancient times to the modern age, people never stopped their efforts in seeking ways for
making more reliable and scientifically sound decisions. For those daily life decision
problems, such as which shirt should one wear to match a given suit and so on, one may
quickly decide it just by using his/her personal preferences, experiences, and/or instincts.
However, in many fields of engineering, business, government, and sciences, where
decisions may be worth millions or billions of dollars, or decisions may have a significant
impact on the welfare of the society, decision-making problems are usually too complex
and anything but as simple as the above one.
For instance, many large companies and organizations face the problem of
prioritizing a set of competing projects. Each one of these projects may have some
short-term and long-term potential profits, costs and some negative or positive side
effects. At the same time, there is a limited budget to be distributed among these projects.
Some of the projects may not get funded at all. Besides these projects, the decision
makers have also defined some criteria to be used to evaluate these projects. When faced
with such decision-making problems, no single decision maker (DM) or group of
decision makers can systematically consider all the available information simultaneously
and reach the right decisions by just using their experiences or personal instincts. For
such cases people need to use valid decision analysis approaches and tools in analyzing
all the issues involved and eventually reaching the optimal decisions. They also need to
do so in a way that can be easily and objectively explained to others and be defended to a
wide audience of stakeholders. This is how and why the field of decision sciences has
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emerged as an important scientific discipline in today’s world.
In the past few decades, numerous decision-making methods and decision aid
software packages have been proposed in the literature and are used in various areas.
Among them, a class of methods known as multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) is
one of the most widely used decision-making methodologies in the sciences, business,
and engineering worlds. MCDM methods aim at improving the quality of decisions by
making the decision-making process more explicit, rational, and efficient. Some
applications of MCDM include the use in civil and environmental engineering
[Zavadskas, et al., 2004; Hobbs and Meier, 2000], in financial engineering [Zopounidis
and Doumpos, 2000], in water resources planning [Raj, 1995], in waste water or solid
waste management [Rogers and Bruen, 1999; Hokkanen and Salminen, 1997], and in
credit risk assessment [Doumpos, et al., 2002].
Although MCDM has attracted the interest of researchers and practitioners for
many years in a wide spectrum of areas, it is far from being mature and there are still a lot
of unresolved issues. One intriguing problem is that oftentimes different methods may
yield different answers when they are fed with exactly the same decision problem and
data. Thus, the issue of evaluating the relative performance of different MCDM methods
is naturally raised. This, in turn, raises the question of how one can evaluate them. Since
it is practically impossible to know which one is the best alternative for a given decision
problem, some kind of testing procedures need to be determined. One such procedure is
to examine the validity of an MCDM method’s mathematical process by checking the
stability and validity of its proposed rankings.
The above subjects, along with some other related issues, have been studied by
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many researchers in the MCDM area [Troutt, 1988; Buchanan, 1994]. In [Triantaphyllou,
2000] some test criteria for checking whether some kinds of ranking irregularities may
happen with some MCDM methods were established to examine the relative performance
of those methods. By using these test criteria, it was found that two well-known MCDM
methods, the original AHP method and the revised AHP method both allow for some
types of rank reversals to happen (the first case of rank reversal identified with the
original AHP method was reported in [Belton and Gear, 1983]). Recently, two ELECTRE
methods – ELECTRE II and III, were also found to suffer of similar rank reversal
problems as the additive AHP methods as discussed in [Wang and Triantaphyllou, 2006]
and [Wang and Triantaphyllou, 2008]. Rank reversal means that the ranking between two
alternatives might be reversed after some variation occurs to the decision problem, like
adding a new alternative, dropping an old alternative or replacing an old alternative by a
worse one etc. For example, two alternatives A1 and A2 may be initially ranked as A1 f
A2 (i.e., A1 is more preferable than A2). After a new alternative A3 is introduced into the
decision problem and the alternatives are ranked again by using the same method, the
ranking between A1 and A2 may be reversed and become A2 f A1. Usually, such a rank
reversal is undesirable. If a method does allow it to happen, the validity of the method
could be questioned.
However, some studies have shown that it is not always unreasonable to have
such rank reversals happening in MCDM problems. The critical question is to be able to
distinguish why they happen. When a method exhibits rank reversals, is it because it
accurately captured the way rational humans deal with decision-making and their
preferences change or is it because the method has some kind of numerical
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instabilities/mathematical defects? Let us put it more clearly through a metaphor: suppose
a method is like a photo camera or X-ray image taking device. One takes a photo or takes
an X-ray image of a subject and sees something strange in that image, like some very
bright spots. Do these bright spots exist in reality or are purely the result of some kind of
hardware defects?
For different MCDM methods and decision models, the answer to the above
question could be very different. Some past research [Belton and Gear, 1983; Dyer,
1990a and 1990b; Triantaphyllou, 2000; Wang and Triantaphyllou, 2008] has shown that
the rank reversal problems with the additive AHP and ELECTRE II and III methods are
mainly due to these methods’ own mathematical artifacts. However, rank reversals could
also happen because people’s rational preferences may change by their emotional feelings.
Here is one such hypothetical example: suppose one is planning to buy a new car and a
dealer offers two cars, say cars A and B. In this hypothetical scenario car A is cheaper
than car B but car B is of better quality than car A. Then, one may decide to buy car A
because it is cheaper. Next, suppose that besides the above two cars, the dealer introduces
a third car C (let us call it a phantom alternative) which may not even be at stock at that
dealership but it has been publicized by the media. This third car C is much more
expensive than the previous two cars but it is of slightly better quality than car B.
Knowing this situation about the third car, the perspective buyer may shift his/her
preference and now choose car B instead of car A without actually changing anything
regarding the two initial cars and the importance of the two evaluative criteria: cost and
quality. When comparing car B with car C, the buyer feels very happy for getting a great
deal by paying much less money to buy an almost equal quality car B. Thus for this
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example, it is this anticipated rejoicing feeling that makes one unintentionally to reverse
his/her preference between cars A and B.
Except rejoicing, another type of emotional feeling which can greatly influence
people’s preference in decision-making is regret. This type of emotional feeling comes
from the fact that humans often base their choices on comparisons across the alternatives
under consideration and relative to “what might have been” under another choice [Plous,
1993; Hastie and Dawes, 2001]. For example, suppose given are two alternatives A1 and
A2 which have been evaluated in terms of three criteria. Assume that by using some
MCDM method, the overall performance value of A1 is better than that of A2 but the
individual performance value a1k of alternative A1 under criterion Ck is worse than that of
alternative A2 under the same criterion (denoted as a2k). Then the decision maker who
chooses A1 and forgoes A2 may experience a certain level of regret because the value a1k
is worse than a2k. This regret feeling could be so strong that he/she may regret to have
chosen A1 instead of A2. In order to avoid the above situation, sometimes the DM would
want to anticipate the regret feeling and consider it in the decision-making process by
making some tradeoffs for a more balanced alternative.
From the above examples, it can be seen that making a choice/decision, no matter
what kind of, can be an intensive emotional experience. When making decisions, except
those cognitive considerations about the decision problems themselves, sometimes people
also need to consider some intense emotional factors, like regret and rejoicing.
Psychologically speaking humans often behave based on a combination of reasons and
emotions. It is natural that decisions should be made by the mind and also by the heart
instead of by a complete rational mind which is dissociated from psychological feelings.
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Studies on the notion of regret and rejoicing for decision-making under uncertainty
have been carried out for over fifty years. However, it is just in recent years that these
emotional factors began to be introduced in deterministic MCDM problems. Though
there are some tentative works on this direction [Kujawski, 2005; Kaliszewski and
Michalowski, 1998], more studies are needed to assess the impact that these emotional
factors might bring to the MCDM problems and the role that they may play in evaluating
alternatives. Meanwhile, an advanced model which can incorporate the notion of regret
and rejoicing systematically in the MCDM modeling framework for conflicting decision
criteria needs to be developed. These are the research subjects of this dissertation.
This dissertation is organized as follows. The next chapter presents a literature
review on MCDM and some studies on rank reversals with the additive AHP methods
and the ELECTRE II and III methods. The third chapter describes how regret and
rejoicing are considered in the decision-making process and some regret models from the
literature. The fourth chapter is the most intriguing one as it proposes to use a linguistic
scale to measure regret and rejoicing and determine the alternatives’ associated regret and
rejoicing values by developing some regret/rejoicing matrices based on pairwise
comparisons. In the fifth chapter, a multiplicative MCDM model is extended to combine
the alternatives’ associated regret and rejoicing values with their performance values in
order to eventually determine their final priorities. The case of having intransitive
rankings and some other issues about the new method are also discussed. In the sixth
section, a numerical example is used to illustrate the process of the proposed new method.
Then, some sensitivity analyses which aim at examining how changes of regret and
rejoicing might affect the ranking results of the decision problems are developed. In the
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seventh chapter, a fuzzy version of the new method is introduced and illustrated by a
numerical example. In the last chapter, some concluding remarks are made on the main
contributions in this dissertation and the meaning of those contributions. Finally, some
possible future research directions are discussed.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW O MCDM
2.1 An Introduction to MCDM
A typical MCDM problem is concerned with the task of ranking a finite number
of decision alternatives, each of which is explicitly described in terms of different
characteristics (also often called attributes, decision criteria, or objectives) which have to
be taken into account simultaneously (as in the previously mentioned project
prioritization problem). Decision criteria may be quantitative (such as cost, age, weight,
volume, etc) or qualitative (such as desirability, aesthetic appeal, style, etc). They can
also be cost criteria (the lower the score is, the more preferable it is) or benefit criteria
(the higher the score is, the more preferable it is). Different decision criteria may be
associated with different units of measure. To combine them together, the criteria values
may need to be normalized. Otherwise, combining them is equivalent to “adding apples
and oranges”. Usually, the alternatives’ performance values under the decision criteria
and the criteria weights are viewed as the entries of a decision matrix defined as in Figure
1. The aij element of the decision matrix represents the performance value of the i-th
alternative in terms of the j-th criterion. The parameter wj represents the weight of the j-th
criterion. Data for MCDM problems can be determined by direct observation (if they are
easily quantifiable) or by indirect means if they are qualitative [Triantaphyllou et al.,
1994].
Another term that is also used frequently to mean the same type of decision
models is multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA). There is a subtle difference between
these two terms. The term MCDM is often used to mean finding the best alternative in
continuous decision spaces. However, in the setting of MCDA, the alternatives are not
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known a priori but they can be determined by calculating the values of a number of
discrete and/or continuous variables. Usually, an MCDA method aims at one of the
following four goals, or “problematics” [Roy, 1985], [Jacquet-Lagreze and Siskos, 2001]:
Problematic 1:

Find the best alternative.

Problematic 2:

Group the alternatives into well-defined classes.

Problematic 3:

Rank the alternatives in order of total preference.

Problematic 4:

Describe how well each alternative meets all the criteria
simultaneously.

Many interesting aspects of MCDA theory and practice are discussed in [Hobbs, 1986],
[Hobbs, et al., 1992], [Stewart, 1992], [Triantaphyllou, 2000], [Zanakis, et al., 1995], and
[Zanakis, et al., 1998]. The terms MCDM and MCDA may also be used to denote the
same class of models.
Criteria
C1

C2

... Cn

(w1

w2

...

wn)

Alternatives ________________________
A1

a11

a12

...

a1n

A2

a21

a22

...

a2n

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Am

am1

am2

...

amn

Figure 1. Structure of a typical decision matrix.
From the early developments of the MCDM theories in the 1950s and 1960s, a
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plethora of MCDM methods have been developed in the literature and new contributions
are continuously coming forth in this area. There are also many ways to classify the
existing MCDM methods. One of the ways is to classify MCDM methods according to
the type of data they use. Thus, there are deterministic, stochastic, and fuzzy MCDM
methods [Triantaphyllou, 2000]. Another way of classifying MCDM methods is
according to the number of the decision makers involved in the decision process. Hence,
there are single decision maker MCDM methods and group decision-making MCDM. For
some representative articles in this area, see [George, et al., 1992], [Hackman and Kaplan,
1974], and [DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987]. In this dissertation, the research concentrates
on single decision maker deterministic MCDM problems which attempt to find the best
alternative subject to a finite number of decision criteria.
2.2 Some Well-known MCDM Methods
Among the numerous MCDM methods, there are several prominent families that
have enjoyed a wide acceptance in the academic area and many real-world applications.
Each of these methods has its own characteristics and background logic. Next is a brief
description of some of them.
2.2.1 The Analytic Hierarchy Process and Some of Its Variants
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (or AHP) method was developed by Professor
Thomas Saaty [Saaty, 1980; Saaty, 1994; and Saaty and Vargas, 2000]. This
decision-making method can help people set priorities and choose the best options by
reducing complex decision problems to a system of hierarchies. Since its inception, it has
evolved into several different variants and has been widely used to solve a broad range of
multi-criteria decision problems [Vaidya and Kumar, 2006].
10

2.2.1.1 The Original Analytic Hierarchy Process
The AHP method uses the pairwise comparisons and eigenvector methods to
determine the aij values and also the criteria weights wj. The details about the pairwise
comparisons and the eigenvector methods can be found in [Saaty, 1980; Saaty, 1994; and
Saaty and Vargas, 2000]. In this method, aij represents the relative performance value of
alternative Ai when it is considered in terms of criterion Cj. In the original AHP method,
the aij values of the decision matrix need to be normalized vertically. That is, the elements
of each column in the decision matrix add up to one. In this way, values with various
units of measurement can be transformed into dimensionless ones. If all the criteria are
benefit criteria, then according to the original AHP method, the best alternative is the one
that satisfies the following expression:
n

*
PAHP
= max Pi = max ∑ aij w j ,
i

i

for i = 1, 2, 3, ..., m.

(2-1)

j =1

From the above formula, we can see that the original AHP method uses an additive
expression to determine the final priorities of the. Next the revised AHP is introduced,
which is also an additive variant of the original AHP method.
2.2.1.2 The Revised Analytic Hierarchy Process
The revised AHP model was proposed by Belton and Gear in [1983] after they
first found a case of rank reversal that occurred when the original AHP method was used.
In their case, the original AHP method was used to rank three alternatives in a simple test
problem. Then a fourth alternative, identical to one of the three alternatives, was
introduced in the original decision problem without changing any other data. The ranking
of the original three alternatives was changed after the revised problem was ranked again

11

by the same method. The following is this rank reversal example from [Belton and Gear,
1983].
Suppose the decision matrix of a decision problem with three alternatives and
three criteria is as follows:
Criteria

Alts.

C1

C2

C3

( 1/3

1/3

1/3 )

___________________

A1

1

9

8

A2

9

1

9

A3

1

1

1

By using the original AHP method, the above decision matrix is normalized first
by the column totals to get the relative data as follows:
Criteria

Alts.

C1

C2

C3

( 1/3

1/3

1/3 )

___________________

A1

1/11

9/11

8/18

A2

9/11

1/11

9/18

A3

1/11

1/11

1/18

Then, it can be shown that the final AHP scores of the three alternatives are: (0.45,
0.47, 0.08). That is, A2 f A1 f A3. Next, a new alternative A4 which is identical to the
existing alternative A2 is added to the decision matrix. Now the normalized decision
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matrix is as follows:
Criteria

Alts.

C1

C2

C3

( 1/3

1/3

1/3 )

___________________

A1

1/20

9/12

8/27

A2

9/20

1/12

9/27

A3

1/20

1/12

1/27

A4

9/20

1/12

9/27

By using the same AHP method, now the final AHP scores of these alternatives are: (0.37,
0.29, 0.06, 0.29). That is, the four alternatives are ranked as A1 f A2 = A4 f A3. This
result contradicts the previous one in which A2 f A1.
According to Belton and Gear the root for this inconsistency is the fact that the
relative values of the alternatives for each criterion sum up to one. So instead of having
the relative values of the alternatives sum up to one, they proposed to divide each relative
performance value by the maximum of the relative values. According to this variant, the
aij values of the decision matrix need to be normalized by dividing the elements of each
column in the decision matrix by the largest value in that column. As before, the best
alternative is given again by the additive formula (2-1), but now the normalization is
different.
n

*
PRevised
− AHP = max Pi = max ∑ aij w j ,
i

i

for i = 1, 2, 3, ..., m.

(2-2)

j =1

The revised AHP was sharply criticized by Saaty in [1990]. After many debates and a
heated discussion (e.g., [Dyer, 1990a; and 1990b], [Saaty, 1983; 1987; and 1990], and
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[Harker and Vargas, 1990]), Saaty accepted this variant and now it is also called the ideal
mode AHP [Saaty, 1994].
However, the revised AHP method was found to suffer of some other ranking
problems even without the introduction of identical alternatives [Triantaphyllou and
Mann, 1989; Triantaphyllou, 2000]. Most of the problematic situations of the additive
AHP methods can be attributed to the required normalization (either by dividing by the
sum of the elements or by the maximum value in a vector) and also the use of an additive
formula on the data of the decision matrix for deriving the final preference values of the
alternatives.
In the core step of one of the MCDM methods known as the Weighted Product
Model (WPM) [Bridgeman, 1922; Miller and Starr, 1969], the use of an additive formula
is avoided by using a multiplicative expression. This brought the development of a
multiplicative version of the AHP method, known as the multiplicative AHP.
2.2.1.3 The Multiplicative Analytic Hierarchy Process
The use of multiplicative formulas in deriving the relative priorities in
decision-making is not new [Lootsma, 1991]. A critical development appears to be the
use of multiplicative formulations when one aggregates the performance values aij with
the criteria weights wj. In the WPM method, each alternative is compared with others in
terms of the product of a number of ratios, one for each criterion. Each ratio is raised to
the power of the relative weight of the corresponding criterion. In general, the following
formula is used ([Bridgeman, 1922; Miller and Starr, 1969]) in order to compare two
alternatives AK and AL:

14

 A  n  aKj
R K  = ∏

 AL  j =1  aLj





wj

(2-3)

If R(AK / AL) > 1, then AK is more desirable than AL (for the maximization case). Then
the best alternative is the one that is better than or at least equal to all other alternatives.
Based on the WPM method, Barzilai and Lootsma in [1994] and Lootsma in
[1999] proposed the multiplicative version of the AHP method. According to this method,
the performance values aij and criteria weights wj are not processed according to formula
(2-1), but the WPM formula (2-3) is used instead. Furthermore, one can use a variant of
formula (2-3) to compute preference values of the alternatives that in turn, can be used to
rank them. The preference values can be computed as follows:
n

Pi ,multi − AHP = ∏ ( aij )

wj

(2-4)

j =1

Please note that if Pi > Pj, then Pi / Pj > 1, or equivalently, Pi – Pj > 0. That is, two
alternatives Ai and Aj can be compared in terms of their preference values Pi and Pj by
forming the ratios or, equivalently, the differences of their preference values.
By using the multiplicative formula, no matter how the decision matrix is
normalized, the ratios of the alternatives’ performance values are kept the same because
the normalization factor is cancelled off in the multiplicative formula. Thus most of the
ranking irregularities which occur to the additive AHP methods will not happen with the
multiplicative AHP method. These properties of the multiplicative AHP method have
been demonstrated theoretically in [Triantaphyllou, 2000].
2.2.2 The ELECTRE Methods
Another prominent role in MCDM methods is played by the ELECTRE approach
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and its derivatives. The acronym ELECTRE stands for: ELimination Et Choix Traduisant
la REalité (ELimination and Choice Expressing REality) [Roy, 1985]. This approach was
first introduced in [Benayoun, et al., 1966]. The main idea of this method is the proper
utilization of what is called “outranking relations” to rank a set of alternatives. The
ELECTRE approach uses the data of the decision problems along with some additional
threshold values set by the decision makers to measure the degree to which each
alternative outranks all others. Soon after the introduction of the first version known as
ELECTRE I [Roy, 1968], this approach has evolved into a number of other variants.
Among those variants, the ELECTRE II [Roy and Bertier, 1971, 1973] and the
ELECTRE III [Roy, 1978] methods have been widely accepted in solving MCDM
problems in the engineering world, like civil and environmental engineering [Hobbs and
Meier, 2000].
For most ELECTRE methods, there are two main stages: the construction of the
outranking relations and the exploitation of these relations to get the final ranking of the
alternatives. Different ELECTRE methods may differ in how they define the outranking
relations between the alternatives and how they apply these relations to get the final
ranking of the alternatives. The construction of the outranking relations is based on the
evaluation of two indices, the concordance index and the discordance index, defined for
each pair of alternatives. The concordance index for a pair of alternatives a and b
measures the strength of the hypothesis that alternative a is at least as good as alternative
b. The discordance index measures the strength of evidence against this hypothesis
[Belton and Stewart, 2001]. There are no unique measures of concordance and
discordance indices. Since the ELECTRE approach is more complicated than the AHP
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approach, the process of ELECTRE II is described next for a simple introduction of its
logic.
In ELECTRE II, the concordance index C(a, b) for each pair of alternatives (a, b)
is defined as follows:
C (a, b) =

∑
∑

i∈Q ( a ,b )
m

wi

.

w
i =1 i

Where Q (a, b) is the set of criteria for which alternative a is equal or preferred to (i.e., at
least as good as) alternative b and wi is the weight of the i-th criterion. One can see that
the concordance index is the proportion of the criteria weights allocated to those criteria
for which a is equal or preferred to b. The discordance index D (a, b) for each pair (a, b)
is defined as follows:

D ( a, b) =

max[ g i (b) − gi (a )]
i

δ

.

Where g i (a ) and gi (b) represent the performance values of alternatives a and b in
terms of criterion Ci and δ = max | g i (b) − gi (a) | (i.e., the maximum difference on any
i

criterion). This formula can only be used when the scores for different criteria are
comparable. After computing the concordance and discordance indices for each pair of
alternatives, two outranking relations are built between the alternatives by comparing the
indices with two pairs of threshold values. They are referred to as the strong and weak
outranking relations.
Next, two pairs of values (C*, D*) and (C —, D —) are defined as the concordance
and discordance thresholds for the strong and weak outranking relations where C*> C —
and D*< D —.

Then the outranking relations will be built based on the following rules:
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(1) If C(a, b) ≥ C*, D(a, b) ≤ D* and C(a, b) ≥ C(b, a), then alternative a is regarded as
“strongly outranking” alternative b.
(2) If C(a, b) ≥ C —, D(a, b) ≤ D— and C(a, b) ≥ C(b, a), then alternative a is regarded
as “weakly outranking” alternative b.
The values of (C*, D*) and (C —, D—) are decided by the decision maker for a particular
outranking relation. These threshold values may be varied to give more or less severe
outranking relations; the higher the value of C*and the lower the value of D*, the more
severe (i.e., stronger) the outranking relation is. That is, the more difficult it is for one
alternative to outrank another one [Belton and Stewart, 2001]. After establishing the
strong and weak outranking relations between the alternatives, the descending and
ascending distillation processes are applied to the outranking relations to get two
pre-orders of the alternatives. Next by combining the two pre-orders together, the overall
ranking of the alternatives is determined. For a detailed description of the distillation
processes, please refer to [Belton and Stewart, 2001] and [Rogers, et al., 1999].
Compared with the simple process and precise data requirement of the AHP
methods, ELECTRE methods apply some more complicated algorithms to deal with
complex and imprecise information from the decision problems and rank the alternatives.
The ELECTRE algorithms look reliable and in neat format. People believe that the
process of this approach could lead to an explicit and logical ranking of the alternatives.
However this is not always the case. In [Wang and Triantaphyllou, 2008], it was found
that the ELECTRE II and III methods may cause some of the same ranking irregularity
problems as the additive AHP methods because of its own mathematical artifacts.
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2.2.3 Rank Reversals with the Additive AHP and the ELECTRE II and III Methods

As mentioned in Section 2.2.1.2, the revised AHP method was found to suffer of
some other ranking problems even without the introduction of identical alternatives.
Besides the rank reversal case found by Belton and Gear in [1983], some other types of
ranking irregularities which happened with the additive AHP methods were reported in
[Triantaphyllou and Mann, 1989; Triantaphyllou, 2000]. In one type of test, a decision
problem is decomposed into a set of smaller problems, each defined on two alternatives
at a time and the same number of criteria as in the original problem. The alternatives are
ranked two at a time and also all of them simultaneously. Then, the ranking of the
alternatives from the smaller problems may not follow the transitivity property or the
combined ranking from the smaller problems may not be the same as the ranking deduced
from the original un-decomposed problem. The reason is that the normalization factor
might be different when alternatives are ranked two at a time or ranked all together. After
the computations of the weighted sums, the overall performance values of the alternatives
might also be different and that could alter their rankings. Another type of irregular
ranking problem is that the indication of the optimal alternative may change when one of
the non-optimal alternatives is replaced by a worse one (given that the other date of the
decision problem remains unchanged). As discussed before, most of the problematic
situations of the additive AHP methods can be attributed to their own mathematical
artifacts.
Although research on the issue of rank reversals happened with the additive AHP
methods has been carried out for more than thirty years, it is still a topic full of
controversies. The AHP method has been widely used in many real-life decision
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problems. Thousands of AHP applications have been reported in edited volumes and
books (e.g., Golden, et al., 1989, Saaty and Vargas, 2000) and on websites (e.g.,
www.expertchoice.com). However, the issue of ranking irregularities has not been fully
known by regular users of these methods. ExpertChoice is popular decision support
software which is based on the algorithm of the AHP method. Recently (i.e., in July of
2008), in an article from Blue Cross Blue Shield in Florida, the author said that Expert
Choice helped them make decisions in an efficient way and avoid delays and
manipulations by few DMs (http://extranet.expertchoice.com/public/
Newsletter_July08.pdf). By using such kind of appealing software packages with friendly
interface, the users usually are very confident that the software can lead them to the
"right" decisions even though they may not be right scientifically. However, if the DMs
know more about issues such as the problems related to irregular rankings which exist
behind the used methods, they may have a more comprehensive and deeper
understanding about the recommended ranking results from such software packages.
Thus, it is imperative to bring to people’s attention the analysis of the validity of
MCDM/MCDA methods and the related issue of ranking irregularities.
For the same goal as above, in [Wang and Triantaphyllou, 2008], the ELECTRE II
and III methods were studied in detail for the validity of their proposed rankings. It was
found that these two methods might cause some of the same ranking irregularity
problems as the additive AHP methods because of their own mathematical artifacts. One
is that the indication of the optimal alternative may change when one of the non-optimal
alternatives is replaced by a worse one. Another one is that the ranking of the alternatives
may not follow the transitivity property when they are compared two at a time. The last
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problem is that the ranking of the alternatives may be different when they are compared
two at a time and also simultaneously. According to some computational experiments and
real-life case studies in [Wang and Triantaphyllou, 2008], for the ELECTRE II and III
methods, the rates of these types of ranking irregularities were rather significant
(sometimes approaching 100%) in both the simulated decision problems and the studied
real-life cases.
By analyzing the ranking processes of the ELECTRE II and III methods and some
rank reversal cases which occurred when these methods were used, it was found that the
main reason for the above rank reversals lies in the exploitation of the pairwise
outranking relations [Wang and Triantaphyllou, 2008] which are the distillation processes
of the ELECTRE II and III methods. The basic idea behind the distillation processes is to
decide the rank of each alternative by the degree of how this alternative outranks all the
other alternatives. Thus, the ranking of a specific alternative derived by these two
methods depends on the performance of all the other alternatives currently under
consideration and also the set of alternatives being compared. This causes the ranking of
the alternatives to depend on each other and leads to the occurrence of the above
mentioned ranking irregularities. For instance, when a non-optimal alternative is replaced
by a worse one, the pairwise outranking relations related to it may be changed
accordingly. Then the overall ranking of the entire alternative set, which depends on those
pairwise outranking relations, may also be changed. The first change is reasonable when
considering the fact that a non-optimal alternative has been replaced by a worse one.
However, the second change may alter the indication of the best ranked alternatives,
which is unreasonable and undesirable.
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The publication of [Wang and Triantaphyllou, 2008], which is the paper titled as
“Ranking Irregularities When Evaluating Alternatives by Using Some ELECTRE
Methods”, has stimulated some deeper discussions with others on the issue of rank
reversals and how should researchers in this area evaluate the performance of different
MCDM methods. Because of its significant potential to the decision-making problems
related to civil and environmental engineering, the research in [Wang and Triantaphyllou,
2008] was funded by an Environmental Education 2003-2004 Award which was
sponsored by the Office of Environmental Education, Office of the Governor, State of
Louisiana.
2.2.4 Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis

Multi-attribute utility analysis (MAUA) is another type of systematic method for
identifying and analyzing various alternatives and factors in order to arrive at a rational
decision [Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Kirkwood, 1997]. This approach transfers the
performance value of an alternative under each decision criterion into a utility value
according to some utility function for that criterion. The utility is a numerical value
between 0 and 1 and it represents the preferability of the alternative under that decision
criterion. Considering the weight of each criterion, the utility of each alternative under
each criterion is multiplied by the weight of that criterion. The total utility of each
alternative can be calculated by summing up the weighted utility values under all the
decision criteria. Then the alternatives are ranked in terms of their total utilities.
One of the key assumptions behind the above utility model is that the DMs are
“Rational Individuals” which are devoid of psychological influences or emotions [Luce,
1992]. Under this assumption, it is expected that DMs will always want to make choices
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that can maximize the utilities of the chosen alternatives and the utilities of the
alternatives are independent of each other. However, behavioral scientists have
demonstrated that it is not always appropriate to relate decision rationality to utility
maximization. Examples demonstrating systematic violations of the utility maximization
principle can be found in [Allais, 1988; Ellsberg, 1961].
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CHAPTER 3. STUDIES O REGRET

Similar assumptions of a completely rational mind and utility maximization are
also behind most of the MCDM methods which do not consider emotional feelings at all
and always determine the alternatives with maximum overall performance values as the
optimal solutions. In order to broaden the assumptions of classical utility theory, some
alternative approaches have been proposed. In [Wierzbicki, 1980], an aspiration-based
method which was developed according to Hebert Simon’s bounded rationality principle
[Simon, 1956] was proposed. Instead of identifying decisions with the maximum utility,
this method helps a DM to identity prospective decisions which satisfy his/her preference
expressed through setting scalarizing parameters for a so-called scalarizing function. In
[Kahneman and Tversky, 1979], a new theory, called Prospect Theory, was developed.
According to this theory, a DM must “edit” prospects (attributes of decisions) before
selecting a decision in order to account for his/her risk attitude (risk seeking or risk
averse).
Another direction of research is to incorporate behavioral issues into the analysis
of decision-making problems, for example, strong emotional feelings like regret and
rejoicing. These two emotional factors were first studied for decision-making under
uncertainty. In [Sugden, 1985] regret was defined as “the painful sensation of recognizing
that ‘what is’ compares unfavorably with ‘what might have been’”. The converse
experience of a favorable comparison between the two is called “rejoicing”. Some
experimental studies confirm that for most individuals regret has the greater impact
[Mellers, 2000]. In related research studies, regret is also the one that has received most
of the attention.
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3.1 Some Regret Models

One of the earliest regret models is known as the minimax regret model which
was introduced by Savage [1951] and was first axiomatized by Milnor [1954]. This
model defines regret as the difference between the actual performance value of each
decision alternative and the best possible value among all alternatives for each state of
nature. Suppose the utility value of an alternative Ai under a state of nature Sk is uik. Then,
the decision maker who chooses Ai will experience a level of regret Rik for the state of
nature Sk where Rik is defined as follows:
Rik = max(u jk ) − uik .
j

The DM would first determine the possible highest level of regret that could occur to
each decision alternative, and then choose the alternative with the minimum of these
maximum regret values [Zeelenberg, 1999]. Because this model decides the selection of
alternatives totally by their regret values, it may lead to irrational choices. Such as a small
disadvantage in a single decision criterion, no matter how large/small its importance is,
may eliminate alternatives with more preferable performance values under more
important criteria [Kujawski, 2005]. Given this undesirable property, the minimax regret
model has not been used widely.
Later, Loomes and Sugden and also Bell proposed a regret theory (referred to as
the RT-B/LS regret theory) simultaneously in 1982 for rational decision-making under
uncertainty [Loomes and Sugden, 1982; Bell, 1982 and 1985]. In the RT-B/LS model,
regret is defined as the psychological reaction that is caused by comparing an outcome
under one state with the payoff one could have had by making a different choice under
the same state. Except the notions of regret and its counterpart rejoicing, the RT-B/LS
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model also considers disappointment and its counterpart elation. Disappointment and
elation depend on the risk and opportunity of the selected action under a state of
uncertainty [Browning and Hillson, 2004]. A rational individual feels some level of
disappointment in decision-making under uncertainty when the outcome does not match
up to expectations, and he/she experiences elation when the outcome exceeds expectation
[Bell, 1985]. Anticipated disappointment and elation are not considerations or influences
for deterministic choices. In contrast, a rational individual may experience regret and
rejoicing when making decisions under certainty as well as uncertainty [Kujawski, 2005].
Since the research in this dissertation focuses on deterministic MCDM problems,
disappointment and elation will not be considered.
The RT-B/LS model assumes that the levels of regret and rejoicing depend on the
difference of the utilities between what is and what could have been. For example, the
associated level of regret when comparing the utility value uik with the utility value ujk is
defined as follows:
 R (u jk − uik ), if uik < u jk
R (uik , u jk ) = 
otherwise.
0,

Where uik is the classical utility of the i-th alternative in terms of the k-th criterion, and
R(.) is a non-decreasing regret function which is further assumed to be convex [Kujawski,
2005].
In [Kujawski, 2005], a regret model called the Reference-Dependent Regret
Model (RDRM) was proposed for deterministic decision-making. Kujawski argued that,
in general, a person’s level of regret when he/she chooses a multi-attribute alternative
often depends explicitly on the absolute values of the utilities of the chosen and forgone
alternatives (i.e., alternatives that were considered but not chosen) rather than simply
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their differences. Thus, in his RDRM model, the anticipated regret when choosing uik and
forgoing ujk is defined as follows:

G (1 − uik ) − G (1 − u jk ), if uik < u jk
R(uik , u jk ) = 
otherwise.
0,
Where G(.) is the regret-building function which measures the level of regret referenced
to the maximum possible utility normalized to 1 and is defined as follows:
1

, if x > 0

G ( x) = 1 + ( B / x) 2×S ×( B + x )
0,
otherwise.

The two parameters B and S in the definition of G(.) are determined by querying the
decision maker about the levels of regret that he/she experiences under each criterion
[Kujawski, 2005]. The RDRM model defines the total level of regret for choosing Ai from
a set S of n (where n ≥ 2) alternatives with m criteria as follows:

RiS = (

n
1 m
)∑ wk ∑ R (uik , u jk ) .
n − 1 k =1 j =1

(3-1)

The final utility of alternative Ai given the set S is defined as follows:
m

m

m

k =1

k =1

k =1

U is = ∑ wk uik − RiS = ∑ wk uik − ∑ wk (

n
1
) ∑ R (uik , ulk ) .
n − 1 l =1

(3-2)

In the above formula, the first term is the classical utility of alternative Ai and the second
term is the anticipated regret for choosing alternative Ai and forgoing all the other
alternatives. Finally, the alternatives are ranked by their final utilities.
Among the previous regret models, the minimax and the RT-B/LS regret models
were originally developed for decision-making under uncertainty. However, both of them
can be tailored to be used in deterministic decision-making problems by identifying the
states of nature with the criteria of a given MCDM problem. For instance, the notion of
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regret in the RDRM model is defined by tailoring Bell’s [1982] notion of anticipated
regret for decision-making under uncertainty. In [Kaliszewski and Michalowski, 1998] it
was also mentioned that the notion of regret becomes meaningful in deterministic
multi-criteria decision problems if the notion of state is equated to the notion of attribute,
and a state/attribute matrix conveys regret type of information (for example, the
difference between ideal and actual values of the attributes).
It needs to be noted that the effect of the anticipated regret/rejoicing is different
from the experienced emotions. In deterministic decision-making situations, decision
makers do not have to experience the emotions in order to be influenced by them. Rather,
they can predict the emotional consequences of different decision outcomes in advance,
and opt for the choices that minimize the possibility of negative emotions [Zeelenberg et
al., 2000]. As stated in [Kujawski, 2005], in the process of choosing a deterministic
alternative, a rational individual may decide to trade off some benefits and forgo the
alternative with the highest total value for a more balanced alternative in order to reduce
his/her level of anticipated regret.
From the previous discussions it is clear that regret theory is based on two
fundamental assumptions: (1) people experience the sensations of regret and rejoicing
which can influence their current decision-making; and (2) when making decisions
people try to anticipate and take into account feelings like regret and rejoicing [Loomes
and Sugden, 1982; Kaliszewski and Michalowski, 1998]. Therefore, building an MCDM
model that incorporates these emotional factors not only can provide a better description
of human behavior in decision-making, but also offers the DMs the flexibility to trade off
some economic benefits explicitly in order to gain a state of psychological satisfaction,
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for prescriptive purposes [Bell, 1985].
3.2 An Alternative Way for Measuring Regret

In [Kujawski, 2005] it was asserted that the RDRM model satisfies three
properties. The first property, referred to as the “independence of dominated alternatives”
(IDA), seems to be an intuitive one. According to this property, given two alternatives Ai
and Aj with Ai f Aj the RDRM model preserves their ranking when a new alternative
dominated by Ai is introduced or an old alternative dominated by Aj is dropped. However,
as demonstrated in [Wang, Triantaphyllou, and Kujawski, 2008], the RDRM model may
fail to satisfy this property. Next, a mathematical analysis why the RDRM model does
not always follow the first property is described in detail.
3.2.1 Mathematical Analysis of the RDRM Model

Given a set S of n alternatives and m criteria, suppose that two alternatives, say
alternatives Ai and Aj, are ranked as Ai f Aj. As described by formula (3-2), the RDRM
utility for alternative Ai and Aj are calculated as follows:
m

m

m

k =1

k =1

k =1

m

m

m

k =1

k =1

k =1

U is = ∑ wk uik − RiS = ∑ wk uik − ∑ wk (
U sj = ∑ wk u jk − R Sj = ∑ wk u jk − ∑ wk (

1 n
)∑ R (uik , ulk )
n − 1 l =1
n
1
)∑ R (u jk , ulk )
n − 1 l =1

For convenience of the discussion, let
m

n

k =1

l =1

Ri′ = ∑ wk ∑ R (uik , ulk ) .

Then

29

m

U is = ∑ wk uik − (
k =1

1
) Ri′ .
n −1

Similarly, let
m

n

k =1

l =1

R j′ = ∑ wk ∑ R (u jk , ulk ) .

Then
m

U sj = ∑ wk u jk − (
k =1

1
) R j′ .
n −1

The difference between U is and U sj is
m

m

k =1

k =1

U is − U sj = (∑ wk uik − ∑ wk u jk ) − (

1
)( Ri′ − R j′ )
n −1

(3-3)

Given that the two alternatives are ranked as Ai f A j , we get

U is − U sj > 0

(3-4)

When introducing a new alternative Ak which is dominated by Ai, the value of Ri′
remains unchanged while the value of R j′ may increase if Ak dominates Aj in terms of
one or more criteria. Thus, in formula (3-3), the part ( Ri′ − R j′ ) may become less than
before. Meanwhile, the number of alternatives in the set S is increased by 1. Under the
above possible changes, if the original value of ( Ri′ − R j′ ) is positive, the term
(

1
)( Ri′ − R j′ ) in formula (3-3) will become smaller than before. Then the inequality
n −1

relation in (3-4) still holds. However, if the original value of ( Ri′ − R j′ ) is negative, the
term (

1
)( Ri′ − R j′ ) may become larger than before. Then the inequality relation in
n −1
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(3-4) may be reversed and hence the ranking between Ai and Aj may be altered. This is
how the RDRM model may fail to satisfy the property of independence of dominated
alternatives.
The implication of the above problem is that when the concepts of regret and
rejoicing are considered and defined in terms of all the available alternatives in
accordance to formula (3-1) of the RDRM model, the anticipated regret and rejoicing
associated with an alternative will be influenced by the number of the considered
alternatives (i.e., the cardinality of the considered set of alternatives) along with their
performance values. Then adding or deleting a dominated alternative (also called
non-Pareto optimal alternative) might affect these values and subsequently the ranking of
the alternatives.
3.2.2 An Alternative Way for Measuring Regret

As mentioned in [Wang, Triantaphyllou, and Kujawski, 2008], Quiggin in [1994]
described a similar problem where manipulation of the set of the alternatives may yield
irrational choices as the ranking of the alternatives might be “money pumped.” That is,
the ranking of the alternatives might be influenced by the introduction of dominated
alternatives. In order to avoid being “money pumped”, Quiggin [1994] proposed that the
measure of regret should satisfy a property called the Irrelevance of Statewise Dominated
Alternatives (ISDA). This property is similar to the IDA property. In order to satisfy the
ISDA property, Quiggin [1994] proved that regret must be determined solely by the best
attainable outcome in each state of the world, or equivalently, the best performance value
of each decision criterion in MCDM problems.
This is in contrast with determining the regret associated with an alternative by
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considering the entire set of alternatives, like averaging the regret contributions produced
by comparing all available choice pairs. When Quiggin’s idea is applied to model regret
in MCDM problems, the regret associated with an alternative is determined only by
comparing the chosen criteria values with the best criteria values. Then addition or
deletion of dominated alternatives cannot affect the regret levels of the other alternatives
because the best criteria values are kept the same.
However, the above idea may not make much sense as illustrated in the following
hypothetical example. Suppose the scores of four students in some exam are according to
the two scenarios as depicted in Tables 1 and 2:
Table 2. Second scenario.

Table 1. First scenario.
Student

Score

Student

Score

A1

30

A1

30

A2

32

A2

98

A3

31

A3

97

A4

100

A4

100

In the first scenario there is just one student who earned a very high score.
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the student who earned only 30 points (i.e., the
very bottom grade) feels some but limited regret for not having achieved a higher score
because his/her performance is not as bad when it is compared to that of most of the other
students. However, in the second scenario, the same student may feel much stronger
regret for scoring only 30 points because he/she is the only student who has a very low
score.
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If one considers the previous two scenarios with a larger number of students (say
200 instead of 4), then the previous effects are much stronger. Therefore, intuitively in
this example, it makes more sense to compute regret in terms of the entire set of
alternatives. Thus, the concepts of regret and rejoicing may be more realistically
expressed in terms of the criteria values of the entire set of alternatives than in terms of
only the best criteria values. This is not the final suggestion. This point is further
discussed in Section 4.3 where the influence of dominated alternatives is discussed.
Please note that a paper on the research problems discussed in Section 3.2 has
been written and is in print for publication in the journal of Systems Engineering. It is a
product of Xiaoting Wang’s collaboration with Dr. Evangelos Triantaphyllou and Dr.
Edouard Kujawski from the Naval Postgraduate School. For more detailed information
about this paper, please refer to [Wang, Triantaphyllou, and Kujawski, 2008].
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CHAPTER 4. A EW WAY TO ASSESS THE ATICIPATED REGRET AD
REJOICIG

From the descriptions in Section 2.1 it can be seen that a rather popular approach
of measuring regret is to quantify regret by using some continuous functions. However,
this approach may have some fundamental weaknesses.
4.1 Limitations of Measuring Regret by Using Continuous Functions

First of all, the definition of continuous regret functions may involve the
determination of certain customizing parameters, such as the B and S parameters in the
regret function G(.) of the RDRM model, as not all decision makers may behave in
exactly the same way. Furthermore, it is not always clear how such parameters may be
determined. It is also unclear whether such functions and their parameters should change
from one criterion to another criterion within the same decision problem.
Another concern is raised from the fact that emotional feelings like regret and
rejoicing vary more in a discrete manner than in a continuous manner. They may not
always increase continuously with the increase of the difference between two compared
performance values. For example, usually people feel a certain level of regret when the
difference is beyond an echelon value or when one of the two compared performance
values is below a cut-off point while the other one is above the cut-off point. Furthermore,
the level of regret may not only depend on the difference but also on the context in which
the difference occurs. For instance, consider three students taking an exam. Two of them
scored 79 and 70 points while another one 69 points. If the cut-off point to get the passing
grade C is 70, or else the grade will be F (fails the exam), then it is quite possible that the
second student (who has earned 70 points) may not have a strong regret feeling when
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comparing his/her score with the first one though their scores are 9 points apart. However,
the third student may feel much stronger regret when comparing his/her score with the
score of the second student though there is only 1 point difference.
As mentioned before, the RT-B/LS model assumes that the levels of regret and
rejoicing depend on the difference of the two compared performance values. Thus Regret
(69, 70) < Regret (70, 79) no matter what the background context is because Difference
(69, 70) = 1 < Difference (70, 79) =9. However, this result may not always make sense as
illustrated above. The RDRM model measures regret by considering the absolute values
of the utilities of the chosen and forgone alternatives rather than simply their difference.
The proposed approach is more reasonable than the RT-B/LS model. However, if a DM
wants to describe a similar regret situation as that of the previous student scoring example,
the two parameters B and S in the regret function G(.) need to be decided very carefully.
Otherwise, it may produce the same result as that of the RT-B/LS model. Considering all
the above issues, it can be seen that regret needs to be measured in a more realistic and
flexible manner.
4.2 Measuring Regret and Rejoicing by Using Linguistic Terms

Please recall that decision criteria may be quantitative or qualitative. Regret and
rejoicing are definitely qualitative aspects in decision problems. To deal with qualitative
criteria, an approach proposed by Saaty [1980] as part of the AHP method has received
widespread attention. One of the key steps of that approach is to ask a DM to select a
linguistic statement (from a small set of linguistic statements) that best describes his/her
assessment of the relative importance of two alternatives when they are considered in
terms of a single criterion at a time. A total of 9 linguistic statements which include 4

35

intermediate values are used to choose from because some psychological studies [Miller,
1956] have shown that most individuals cannot simultaneously compare more than seven
objects (plus or minus two). Each linguistic statement is also associated with a numerical
value to reflect its natural importance.
The idea of pairwise comparisons along with the application of linguistic
statements can also be used to measure a DM’s anticipated regret and rejoicing values.
(For simplicity, the following discussions are based on regret as rejoicing can be analyzed
in an analogous manner.) According to the rule of 7 plus or minus two, a set of 9
linguistic choices which include 4 intermediate values can be developed and used to
estimate a DM’s anticipated regret value for choosing one alternative and forgoing
another one under a specific criterion. Each linguistic term is attached to a numerical
value as shown in Table 3.
Suppose we are considering two alternatives Ai and Aj and their performance
values in terms of some benefit criterion Ck are aik and ajk, respectively. If aik > ajk, there
is no regret for choosing aik over ajk. Then the regret value is equal to the lowest level
which is attached with a value 1. Otherwise, a linguistic statement should be selected
from Table 3 and the corresponding numerical value will be attached to the associated
regret value. Please note that the numerical value attached to the lowest linguistic term
“no distinguishable regret” is 1. This is the case because in Section 4 some multiplicative
formulas will be proposed to process the data and the identity under numerical
multiplication is 1.
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Table 3. Proposed scale for measuring pairwise regret values.
Linguistic Expression

The feeling of regret when choosing alternative Ai over

umerical Value

1

alternative Aj is not distinguishable.
The feeling of regret when choosing alternative Ai over

3

alternative Aj is noticeable.
The feeling of regret when choosing alternative Ai over

5

alternative Aj is strong.
The feeling of regret when choosing alternative Ai over

7

alternative Aj is very strong.
The feeling of regret when choosing alternative Ai over

9

alternative Aj is as strong as it can be.
The intermediate values of 2, 4, 6, and 8 are used when the DM

2, 4, 6, 8

feels that the best answer lies between two successive linguistic
choices from the above list of choices.

Following the above steps, the decision maker is able to fill in the entries of a
pairwise comparison matrix for regret; one such matrix for each one of the decision
criteria. These matrices are called here pairwise regret matrices. For simplicity, let us
denote the entry of a typical pairwise regret matrix as rij (for i, j = 1,2,3, …, m). Then rij =
R(aik, ajk), which is the anticipated regret for choosing alternative Ai and forgoing
alternative Aj in terms of a specific decision criterion Ck. A complete pairwise regret
matrix is shown in Figure 2.
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Alts.

(A1

A2

...

Am)

-----------------------

Alts.

A1

1

r12

...

r1m

A2

r21

1

...

r2m

.

.

.

.

.

Am

rm1

rm2

...

1

Figure 2. A typical pairwise regret matrix.
The entries of a pairwise regret matrix should satisfy the following two basic conditions:
(1)

ri i = 1, for any i = 1, 2, 3, …, m;

(2)

If ri j > 1, then rj i = 1, for any i, j = 1, 2, 3, …, m.

The first rule means that there is no regret when an alternative is compared to itself. The
second rule means that if there is a certain level of regret for choosing alternative Ai over
alternative Aj, then there is no regret for choosing Aj over Ai.
The use of this set of linguistic terms to estimate a DM’s anticipated regret
feelings is in essence a mechanism for eliciting a hidden discrete regret function from the
DM. This hidden discrete regret function might be different for different decision
problems and/or decision criteria within the same problem. For example, a DM’s
perception of regret might be different stepwise functions for different decision criteria.
By using the linguistic terms, the DM has the flexibility to decide the specific tendencies
of his/her anticipated regret feelings according to the specific situations of his/her
decision problems.
However, too much flexibility could sometime lead to arbitrary results. Thus
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some consistency tests are needed to examine the general trend of a DM’s assessments of
regret and make sure that the assessed pairwise regret values do not violate some basic
psychological principles. When examining the consistency of the pairwise regret values,
a reference point needs to be decided. The reference point could be the chosen
alternative’s performance value or the forgone alternative’s performance value. Generally
speaking, under a given reference point, the bigger the difference between two compared
performance values is, the more likely is that the DM may have a stronger regret feeling
for choosing the worse performance value and forgoing the better performance value.
That is, under a given reference point, the DM’s perception of anticipated regret should
be monotonically increasing with the increase of the difference between two compared
performance values. Based on this principle, two tests are developed next to examine if
there is any evident inconsistency within the DM’ assessments of the pairwise regret
values.
Without loss of generality, suppose that the performance values of m alternatives
in terms of the k-th benefit criterion are sorted in ascending order such that a1k < a2k < a3k
< a4k < … < amk. By using the chosen performance value and the forgone performance
value as reference points individually, the pairwise regret values R(aik, ajk), for i, j =1, 2,
3, ..., m and i < j, should satisfy the following two conditions:
(1)

R(aik, ajk) < R(aik, a(j+1)k) < ... < R(aik, amk).
For example: R(a1k, a2k) < R(a1k, a3k) < R(a1k, a4k) < ... < R(a1k, amk).

(2)

R(a1k, ajk) > R(a2k, ajk) > ... > R(a(j-1)k, ajk).
For example: R(a1k, amk) > R(a2k, amk) > R(a3k, amk) > ... > R(a(m-1)k, amk).

For each criterion, if the DM is consistent with his/her assessments, then his/her
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anticipated regret values should satisfy the above two relations. Otherwise, the DM needs
to re-assess the inconsistent parts of his/her assessments. The above tests are further
illustrated in a numerical example in Section 6.
Please note that the proposed linguistic scale and definition of the pairwise
comparisons are fundamentally different than those introduced by Saaty as part of the
AHP method. In Saaty’s scale, linguistic terms are used to assess the relative importance
of two alternatives (that is, the ratio of their importance) in terms of each one of the
decision criteria or the relative importance of two criteria at a time. Some examples of
such linguistic expressions are “A is more important than B” or “A is of the same
importance as B,” or “A is a little more important than B,” and so on [Saaty, 1980 and
1994]. According to Saaty’s scale, the available numerical values for the pairwise
comparisons are members of the set: {9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1/2, 1/3, 1/4, 1/5, 1/6, 1/7,
1/8, 1/9}. If in the evaluation of two alternatives, say Ai and Aj, the DM selects some
entry from the scale with a value from the sub-interval [1, 9], then the reciprocal
comparison of comparing alternative Aj with alternative Ai takes on the reciprocal of the
previous value. That is, the value is in the interval [1/9, 1]. For instance, if aij = 7, then aji
= 1/7. On the other hand, with the proposed linguistic scale, if rij takes a value between [1,
9], then rji will always have the value 1. This means that if there is a certain level of
regret for choosing alternative Ai over alternative Aj in terms of criterion Ck, then there is
no regret (i.e., the corresponding value is equal to 1) for choosing Aj over Ai under the
same criterion. This follows directly from the definition of the concept of regret and the
need to use multiplication in the related formulas.
Another major difference between the two linguistic scales is that the elicited
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pairwise values are subject to different consistency tests. When using Saaty’s scale to
assess the relative importance of each pair of the alternatives (or criteria), if all the
pairwise comparisons are perfectly consistent with each other, then the following relation
should always be true for any three comparisons aik , ajk , and aij [Saaty, 1980]:
aik × ajk = aij , for any 1 < i, j, k < m.
The previous consistency test makes sense because of the very way pairwise comparisons
are defined by Saaty; they are ratios of relative importance of two decision entities
(alternatives or criteria). However, with the proposed linguistic scale, it is not required
that a DM has to assess his/her level of regret as the ratio of two performance values. The
DM has the flexibility to adapt the use of the new linguistic scale to the nature of a given
decision problem. For example, a DM may decide his/her level of regret by comparing
the chosen and forgone performance values individually with a specific threshold value
as in the student score example. Thus their assessed pairwise regret values do not need to
satisfy Saaty’s consistency relation but instead they need to satisfy the two consistency
tests developed previously.
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CHAPTER 5. A MCDM METHOD BASED O REGRET AD REJOICIG

At this point it is assumed that the DM has developed the regret and rejoicing
pairwise comparison matrices for a given decision problem. In this section, a
multiplicative MCDM approach is proposed to process the data in these matrixes and also
to aggregate the regret and rejoicing values with the criterion values in order to derive the
final priorities of the alternatives and then rank them.
5.1 A Multiplicative MCDM Model Based on Regret and Rejoicing

As mentioned in Chapter 2, some studies have reported that some types of rank
reversals may occur with the original AHP method and the revised AHP method. Most of
the problematic situations of the additive AHP methods can be attributed to the required
normalization and also the use of an additive formula on the data of the decision matrix
for deriving the overall performance values of the alternatives. However, in the WPM
model and the multiplicative AHP method, the use of an additive formula is avoided by
using a multiplicative expression. By using the multiplicative formula, no matter how the
decision matrix is normalized, the ratios of the alternatives’ performance values are kept
the same because the normalization factor is cancelled off in the multiplicative formula.
Thus most of the ranking irregularities which occurred with the additive AHP methods
will not happen with the multiplicative AHP method.
Because of the above mentioned virtues, a similar multiplicatively formulated
model is proposed to combine the alternatives’ performance values with their associated
regret and rejoicing values. First, a formula as the one in (2-4) is used to aggregate the
alternatives’ performance values under the different decision criteria. For an alternative Ai,
its overall performance value is computed as follows:
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n

Pi = ∏ aikwk .

(5-4)

k =1

Next, the same formula is used to aggregate the alternatives’ regret and rejoicing values
under each one of the decision criteria. Then, the overall regret value of alternative Ai is
as follows:
n

Ri = ∏ rikwk .

(5-5)

k =1

Similarly, the overall rejoicing associated with alternative Ai is:
n

J i = ∏ jikwk .

(5-6)

k =1

In the above formulas, aik is the performance value of alternative Ai in terms of criterion
Ck, and rik and jik are the anticipated regret and rejoicing values associated with Ai in
terms of criterion Ck. To be consistent with the above multiplicative formulas, rik is
defined as the geometric mean of the regret contributions generated when alternative Ai is
compared with each of the other alternatives under the decision criterion Ck. That is,
1

m

rik = [∏ R (aik , a jk )]m −1 .

(5-7)

j =1

Similarly, jik is defined as follows:
1

m

jik = [∏ J ( aik , a jk )] m −1 .

(5-8)

j =1

Next, a ratio formula is used to combine the alternatives’ overall performance
values, overall regret and rejoicing values together so that any potential normalization
operation would not be able to affect the proportion of these three parts playing in the
alternatives’ final priority values. Assume that a DM wishes to consider his/her
anticipated regret and rejoicing for a given MCDM problem which has m alternatives and
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n benefit decision criteria. The formula for computing the final priority of each
alternative is defined as follows:

Pi* =

n

n

k =1

k =1

∏ aikwk × ∏ jikwk

Pi J i
=
Ri

n

∏r

n

= ∏(
k =1

wk
ik

aik jik wk
) , for i = 1, 2, 3, ..., m.
rik

(5-9)

k =1

Since regret is like a cost criterion (i.e., the smaller the value the better) it is placed in the
denominator of the above formula. On the contrary, rejoicing is like a benefit criterion
(i.e., the higher the value the better) thus it is placed in the numerator of the above
formula.
A more general decision problem is assumed to have m alternatives and n decision
criteria of which, without loss of generality, the first n1 are benefit criteria and the
remaining (n-n1) are cost criteria. When considering both the anticipated regret and
rejoicing, the formula to compute the final priority of each alternative becomes:

B

Pi* =

B
i
B
i

C
i
C
i

Pi J J
=
Pi C R R

n1

n1

k =1

k =1
n1

∏ aikwk × ∏ jikwk ×
n

∏a

wk
ik

k = n1 +1

×∏ r
k =1

wk
ik

×

n

∏

jikwk

k = n1 +1
n

∏r

wk
ik

n1

= ∏(
k =1

n
aik jik wk
j
) × ∏ ( ik ) wk .
rik
k = n1 +1 aik rik

(5-10)

k = n1 +1

Where RiB is the overall anticipated regret of alternative Ai under the benefit criteria;
J iB is the overall anticipated rejoicing of alternative Ai under the benefit criteria;
Pi B is the overall performance value of alternative Ai under the benefit criteria;
RiC , J iC and Pi C have the similar meaning as the above ones but in terms of the cost

criteria.
As mentioned before, next either one of the following two rules could be used to
rank two alternatives:
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P1* − P2* > 0 ⇔

P1*
> 1.
P2*

For example, to compare two alternatives Ai and Aj, the following ratio can be calculated
(for simplicity, assume that all the criteria are benefit criteria):
A
R i
A
 j

n
 Pi * Pi J i R j
rjk
a
j
=
=
×
×
=
( ik × ik × ) wk

∏
*
Pj J j Ri
j jk rik
k =1 a jk
 Pj

(5-11)

In general, if R(Ai / Aj ) > 1, it indicates that Ai is more preferable than Aj. For a stricter
ranking, a threshold value could be used to decide if the difference between two priority
values is significant enough to conclude with high confidence that one is more preferable
than the other. For example, assume that we get P1* > P2* . Then in order to decide with
high confidence that A1 is more preferable than A2, their final priorities may need to
satisfy a more restrictive relation as follows:
P1* − P2*
≥ some threshold value .
P2*

(5-12)

The above relation means that one priority value should be at least larger than the other
one by a threshold percentage in order to conclude with high confidence that one is more
preferable than the other.
The threshold value can be decided by the situation of a specific application. For a
general purpose, it could be 10%. Please note that with the introduction of a threshold
value, the rankings of the alternatives may become intransitive. For example,
assume P1* > P2* > P3* . Under a certain threshold value, if both the difference between
P1* and P2* and the difference between P2* and P3* are very small and could not satisfy

inequality (5-12), A1 will be ranked as equal to A2 and A2 will be ranked as equal to A3.
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From the transitivity point of view, one would expect that A1 should also be ranked as
equal to A3. However, the difference between A1 and A3 may be large enough to satisfy
inequality (5-12), and then A1 will be ranked higher than A3.
One needs to keep in mind the presence of a computability issue when using the
proposed multiplicative formulas. This issue is associated with the scales that are used to
measure the alternatives’ performance values under the criteria. Scales for measurement
can be nominal (for example, gender), ordinal (for example, degree of satisfaction),
interval (for example, temperature) or ratio (for example, length). The difference between
an interval scale and a ratio scale is that a ratio scale has a natural zero point but an
interval scale does not. Because it has a natural zero, a ratio scale is unique under a
positive multiplicative transformation. This means that any ratio scale can be multiplied
by a positive constant and the result would still be a ratio scale of the same phenomenon,
but just in different units [Drummond et al., 2005]. This property is used, for example, to
convert feet to yards, or meters to miles.
However, an interval scale has no natural zero. It is unique under a positive linear
transformation [Drummond et al., 2005]. This means that any interval scale x can be
transformed to a scale y using a function y = a + bx, where a can be any constant and b
can be any positive constant. The result will still be an interval scale of the same
phenomenon, but in different units and with a different zero point. For instance, this
property can be used to convert temperature from Fahrenheit (F) to Celsius (C) units.
As result of the above, ratios of differences between interval scores have meaning,
but ratios of interval scores do not. For example, with temperature, it is correct to state
that the difference between 80F and 40F is twice the difference between 60F and 40F, but
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it is not correct to state that 80F is twice as hot as 40F. The first statement holds true
whether the temperature is measured in F or C, while the second does not. For a ratio
scale, both types of ratios have meaning. For instance, in length, it is both correct to state
that the difference between 80 miles and 40 miles is twice as much as the difference
between 60 miles to 40 miles, and 80 miles is twice as long as 40 miles. Both of the
statements remain true no matter the lengths are measured in inches or miles.
Because of the above properties with ratio scale and interval scale, under the
proposed multiplicative formulas, the ratio of two performance values measured by a
ratio scale is the same no matter what unit is used. For example, the ratio of two
monetary values expressed in Euros is the same as that of the two values expressed in US
Dollars. But the ratio of two performance values measured by an interval scale might be
different if they are transformed to other units. For instance, the ratio of two temperature
values 40F and 60F is different when exactly the same temperature values are expressed
in Celsius units. Please note that this problem lies in the use of the interval scale itself.
Whether they are operated by additive or multiplicative formula, the proportions or the
ratios of interval scores might be different if they are expressed in another unit. Users
should be aware of this problem when they use interval scales. If it is unavoidable to use
an interval scale to measure alternatives in terms of some criterion, it might be necessary
to check how the ranking result might be changed when a different unit is used (such as
the F and C units for temperature). If all criteria are measured by using ratio scales, there
is no such problem.
5.2 Influence of Dominated Alternatives and the Intransitivity Problem

Though using the multiplicative formula can avoid the negative influence of
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normalization operations, the way to measure regret/rejoicing introduces new
interdependences into the ranking of the alternatives. As discussed in Section 3.2, when
regret and rejoicing are measured by considering all available alternatives, the anticipated
regret and rejoicing associated with one alternative will be influenced by the number of
the considered alternatives (i.e., the cardinality of the set of the alternatives). By
introducing or deleting a dominated alternative, the alternatives’ associated regret and
rejoicing values might be changed and then the ranking of them might also be altered or
even completely reversed. It is not hard for someone to fabricate some nonexistent or
arbitrary dominated alternatives and add them into the set of alternatives in order to boost
his/her own preferred alternatives in an unfair way. Thus it is further suggested that
dominated alternatives should be eliminated before using the proposed method to rank a
set of alternatives and regret and rejoicing should be better measured by considering all
available Pareto-optimal (i.e., nondominated) alternatives. In this manner the negative
influence of dominated alternatives could be avoided and the idea of measuring regret
and rejoicing by considering the existence of other alternatives instead of only the
alternatives with the best criteria values is also considered to a certain degree.
Because of the same reason, the ranking of the alternatives by using the new
method may not follow the transitivity property when they are ranked two at a time and
regret and rejoicing are measured in terms of only the two alternatives. However,
occurrence of this particular kind of intransitivity may not always be a negative aspect.
Some studies [May, 1954; Tversky, 1969; Roberts, 1972] have shown that a rational DM
may exhibit a certain level (although of limited size) of intransitivity in his/her
comparison of alternatives in the decision-making process. Some degree of inconsistency
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seems to be inherent in human decision-making. Thus it might be natural to allow certain
intransitivity to exist in a decision-making process where emotional factors are involved.
However, the fact that intransitivity may be exhibited by rational decision makers
does not mean that a very large number of intransitive cases are necessarily a benign
aspect to have. As mentioned before, the ELECTRE II and III methods were shown in
[Wang and Triantaphyllou, 2008] to exhibit very high frequencies of intransitivity within
a large number of simulated problems and also on a random collection of real-life case
studies. To get a feeling about the intransitivity rate of the proposed method, a similar test
was carried out to the new method by using some simulated decision problems.
In the simulated decision problems, the number of the alternatives and the number
of criteria were set to the following 7 values: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. Thus, a total of 49 (that is,
7 × 7) different cases were examined with 5,000 randomly generated decision problems
per case. For each simulated decision problem, the corresponding regret matrixes which
satisfy the consistency tests described in Section 3.2 were also generated randomly.
During the test, each simulated decision problem was decomposed into a set of smaller
problems, each defined on two alternatives at a time and the same number of criteria as in
the original problem. Then the alternatives in the smaller problems were ranked and the
rankings were examined. Any occurred intransitivity among the paired rankings was
recorded. Figure 3 shows the test results. In this figure, different curves correspond to
cases with different numbers of alternatives; the horizontal axis stands for the number of
criteria and the vertical axis is the rate of intransitivity that occurred in the 5,000
simulated decision problems.
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Figure 3. Intransitivity rate of the new method.
As reported in [Triantaphyllou, 2000] and [Wang and Triantaphyllou, 2008], the
same kind of intransitivity could also happen with the original and the revised AHP
methods, and the ELECTRE II and III methods. For a simple comparison, when the
number of alternatives is 9 and the number of criteria is 7, according to the test results
reported in those studies, the intransitivity rate of the original AHP method is about 10%;
for the revised AHP method it is about 26%; for the ELECTRE II method, it is about 85%;
while for the ELECTRE III method it is almost 100%. According to the results shown in
Figure 3, for the new method the intransitivity rate is about 44%. However, the
intransitivity cases will not happen with the new method when regret and rejoicing are
not considered.
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CHAPTER 6. A UMERICAL EXAMPLE AD SOME SESITIVITY
AALYSES
6.1 A umerical Example

In this chapter a numerical example is used to illustrate the application of the
proposed method. It is a simulated example and the data were generated randomly by a
computer program. In this example, there are 4 alternatives and 3 criteria. The
performance values of the alternatives under the three criteria are as follows:
C1

C2

C3

A1

19

6

15

A2

15

7

4

A3

4

9

16

A4

5

12

4

The weights of the criteria are: W = [0.35 0.42 0.23];
For simplicity, assume that the DM only wants to consider his/her anticipated
regret. In terms of the three decision criteria, the corresponding regret matrixes are
simulated as follows. The simulated pairwise regret matrix in terms of criterion C1 is
assumed to be as follows:
C1

A1

A2

A3

A4

A1

1

1

1

1

A2

3

1

1

1

A3

8

6

1

2

A4

5

4

1

1
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The simulated pairwise regret matrix in terms of criterion C2 is assumed to be as follows:
C2

A1

A2

A3

A4

A1

1

8

8

8

A2

1

1

3

6

A3

1

1

1

4

A4

1

1

1

1

The simulated pairwise regret matrix in terms of criterion C3 is assumed to be as follows:
C3

A1

A2

A3

A4

A1

1

1

3

1

A2

3

1

4

1

A3

1

1

1

1

A4

3

1

4

1

Now we need to examine if the above simulated regret values satisfy the two
consistency relations described in Section 4.2. After some examination, it was found that
they did satisfy the consistency tests. For instance, in terms of the second criterion, the
four alternatives’ performance values are 6, 7, 9, and12. They are in ascending order
because of a12 < a22 < a32 < a42. From the simulated regret matrix in terms of the second
criterion, it can be seen that:
(1)

R(a12, a22) = 8 < R(a12, a32) = 8 < R(a12, a42) = 8.
R(a22, a32) = 3 < R(a22, a42) = 6.

(2)

R(a12, a42) = 8 > R(a22, a42) = 6 > R(a32, a42) = 4.
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R(a12, a32) = 8 > R(a22, a32) = 6.
This shows that these regret values satisfy the two consistency relations. Similarly, the
pairwise regret values under the other criteria can also be examined.
Next, by applying formula (5-7) to the above regret matrixes, we can get:
1

4

1

4

r21 = [∏ r ( a21 , a j1 )]4−1 = 3 3

r11 = [∏ r (a11 , a j1 )] 4−1 = 1

r31 = 3 96

r41 = 3 20

j =1

j =1

r12 = 3 512

r22 = 3 18

r32 = 3 4

r42 = 1

r13 = 3 3

r23 = 3 12

r33 = 1

r43 = 3 12

Where rik is the anticipated regret value associated with alternative Ai in terms of criterion
Ck, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and k = 1, 2, 3. All of the above values can also be put in a table as
follows (please note that the equivalent decimal expressions are used in this table):
rik

C1

C2

C3

A1

1.0000

8.0000

1.4422

A2

1.4422

2.6207

2.2894

A3

4.5789

1.5874

1.0000

A4

2.7144

1.0000

2.2894

Then, by applying formula (5-9), we can get the final preference values of these
alternatives.
3

P ∏
P = 1 = k 3=1
R1
*
1

a1wkk

∏r

wk
1k

3

= ∏(
k =1

aik wk
19
6
15
) = ( ) w1 × ( ) w2 × ( 3 ) w3 = 4.256
rik
1
8
3

k =1

P2* = 3.899

P3* = 3.74

P4* = 3.998
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Without considering any threshold value for the final ranking of the alternatives, the
above results indicate:

A1 f A4 f A2 f A3.

If using the ratio formula (5-11), we can get:
 A1  P1*
 A1
 A1  P1*
,
R
R   = * = 1.1
  = * = 1.14 , R 
 A4
 A3  P3
 A2  P2

 P1*
 = * = 1.06
 P4

 A  P*
 A  P*
 A  P*
R  2  = 2* = 1.04 , R  2  = 2* = 0.98 , R  3  = 3* = 0.94
 A4  P4
 A4  P4
 A3  P3

The above ratios indicate the same ranking as before as it should be.
6.2 Some Sensitivity Analyses

Sometimes it is hard for a DM to precisely capture his/her perception of regret
and rejoicing by using a specific linguist term. Thus, it is necessary to study how changes
of regret and rejoicing values could affect the ranking results of the decision problems.
There are many studies on sensitivity analysis for deterministic MCDM models [Masuda,
1990; Armacost and Hosseini, 1994]. Usually, a sensitivity analysis aims at examining
how changes on the weights of the criteria or changes on the performance values of the
alternatives could affect the ranking results of the decision problems. In [Triantaphyllou
and Sanchez, 1997; Triantaphyllou, 2000], these two types of sensitivity problems were
analyzed in detail and two corresponding sensitivity analysis approaches were proposed
for three major MCDM methods which included the weighted sum model, the weighted
product model, and the additive AHP methods. The first approach aims at determining
what the smallest changes in the current weights of the criteria are which can alter the
existing ranking of the alternatives. The second approach uses the same concept as the
first one to determine how critical the various performance values of the alternatives (in
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terms of a single decision criterion at a time) are in the ranking of the alternatives
[Triantaphyllou, 2000]. Both of these two approaches can also be applied
straightforwardly to the proposed new method for solving the same kinds of sensitivity
analysis problems.
Following the same approach as in [Triantaphyllou, 2000], next some sensitivity
analysis procedures are developed to determine what the minimum change is in a specific
regret value such that the ranking between two alternatives will be altered.
6.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis in Terms of an Alternative’s Aggregated Regret Value
under a Given Criterion

Suppose the criteria of a decision problem are all benefit criteria and the DM is
interested to see how change in a specific regret value might be able to alter the ranking
between two alternatives Ai and Aj. Let rik represent the associated regret of alternative Ai
under criterion Ck; let Ti k j denote the change in the regret value rik (all the other regret
values are kept the same) such that the ranking of alternatives Ai and Aj will be altered.
First, let us assume, before the change of rik, the ranking between alternatives Ai and Aj is
Ai f Aj. Then, by using the proposed method, the ratio R(Ai / Aj ) should be greater than
1 in order for alternative Ai to be more preferred than alternative Aj. That is:
A
R i
A
 j

n
 Pi J i R j
r
a
j
= ∏ ( ik × ik × jk ) wk > 1 .
 = × ×
 Pj J j Ri k =1 a jk j jk rik

Let R /(Ai / Aj) denote the new ratio after the Ti k j change has occurred on the regret value
rik. The new ratio should be less than or equal to 1. Let ti k j denote the threshold value of
Ti k j, which is the minimum change that has to occur in rik such that the original ranking
between alternatives Ai and Aj will be altered. In this case, the new ratio will be as
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follows:
A
R/  i
A
 j

n
 Pi * Pi J i R j
r
r
r
a
j
=
=
×
×
=
( ik × ik ) wk × ( j1 ) w1 × ... × ( jk/ ) wk × ... × ( jn ) wn ≤ 1.

∏
*
ri1
rik
rin
 Pj Pj J j Ri k =1 a jk j jk

Let rik/ = rik + τ i ,k , j , then
A
R/  i
A
 j

 n aik jik w
rj1 w
rjk
rjn
r
) wk × ( ik ) wk × ... × ( ) wn
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 Aj 
rik + τ i ,k , j
 

From the above relation and R(Ai / Aj ) > 1, we can get



 Ai
A
 j

τ i ,k , j ≥ rik  w R 



k

 
 − 1 > 0.
 

(6-1)

Then,
r = rik + τ i , k , j
/
ik

A
Because here R  i
A
 j


 > 1 , then



 Ai  
A 

w
≥ rik + rik k R   − 1 = rik wk R  i  .
A  
A 

 j 
 j


wk

A
R i
A
 j


A 
 > 1 . Let Q = wk R  i  − 1 , then Q > 0 and

 Aj 

rik/ ≥ (Q + 1)rik .

(6-2)

From inequality (6-2), it can be seen that if the regret value rik is increased by at
least Q × 100% , the ranking between Ai and Aj will be altered.
Next, assume the ranking between alternatives Ai and Aj is Ai p Aj. Then R(Ai /
Aj ) should be less than 1 and the new ratio R /(Ai / Aj ) should be larger than or equal to 1.
That is,
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From the above relation and R(Ai / Aj ) < 1, we can get
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 Aj
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(6-3)

Then,


A
rik/ = rik + τ i , k , j ≤ rik + rik  wk R  i
A

 j

A
This time R  i
 Aj
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A
R i
A
 j

 
A
 − 1 = rik wk R  i
 
 Aj


 .


A 

 < 1 , Q = wk R  i  − 1 < 0 , and

 Aj 
rik/ ≤ (1 + Q) rik .

(6-4)

From inequality (6-4), it can be seen that if the regret value rik is decreased by at
least Q × 100% , the ranking between Ai and Aj will be altered.
Furthermore, the following condition should also be satisfied for the changed
regret value to be feasible:

rik/ = rik + τ i , k , j ≥ 1, or τ i , k , j ≥ 1 − rik .
The above relation is true because 1 is the minimum regret value for the proposed
multiplicative model and it cannot be decreased further. In summary, to alter the ranking
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between two alternatives Ai and Aj, the value of Ti,k j; the change in the single regret value
rik , should be within the following ranges:

if originally Ai f Aj ,
0 < rik Q ≤ Ti ,k , j ,

 1 − rik ≤ Ti ,k , j ≤ rik Q < 0, if originally Ai p Aj .
Please note, if Ti,k j is positive, it means that the regret value rik needs to be increased in
order to alter the ranking between Ai and Aj. Otherwise, it needs to be decreased.
The same sensitivity analysis can also be carried out to determine what the change
is in a specific rejoicing value which can alter the ranking between two alternatives Ai
and Aj. Let Oi k,j denote the change in the rejoicing value jik (all the other rejoicing values
are kept the same) such that the ranking between Ai and Aj will be altered. Similar
derivations indicated that Oi k,j should be within the following ranges:


A  
1− jik ≤ Oi ,k , j ≤ jik  wk R  j  − 1 < 0, if originally Ai f A j ,


 Ai  





 Aj  
if originally Ai p A j .
 0 < jik  wk R   − 1 ≤ Oi ,k , j ,

Ai  




For instance, applying the above sensitivity analysis results to the example in
Section 5.1, we can get a 3-D table as Table 4. In Table 4, the entry (i, k, j) is the Q value
corresponding to ti

k j,

the minimum change in rik. The value of Q is the minimum

percentage that rik need to be changed such that the ranking between alternatives Ai and Aj
will be altered. For instance, the entry (2, 1, 3) is 0.0146 which is the Q value
corresponding to t2 1 3. This value indicates that if the regret value of r21 is increased by at
least 1.46% from the current value (i.e., 1.442) to (1+0.0146) × 1.442 = 1.463, the ranking
between A2 and A3 will be altered. Similarly, the entry (3, 2, 4) is -0.0276. It indicates that
if the regret value of r32 is decreased by at least 2.76% from the current value (i.e., 1.5874)
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to (1-0.0276) × 1.5874 = 1.5436, the ranking between A3 and A4 will be altered.
Table 4. Threshold values in relative terms for the example in Section 5.1.
Criterion Ck
C3 Alt.(Aj)

Alt.(Ai)

C1

C2

A1

=/A

0.0375

0.0204

A2

A1

=/A

0.0558

0.0302

A3

A1

=/A

0.0266

0.0145

A4

A2

-0.0302

-0.0362

-0.0200

A1

A2

0.0146

0.0176

0.0096

A3

A2

-0.0088

-0.0105

-0.0058

A4

A3

-0.0442

-0.0528

=/A

A1

A3

-0.0144

-0.0173

=/A

A2

A3

-0.0231

-0.0276

=/A

A4

A4

-0.0217

=/A

-0.0143

A1

A4

0.0089

=/A

0.0058

A2

A4

0.0236

=/A

0.0154

A3

Please note, if originally rik = 1 (which means that there is no regret when
alternative Ai is compared with all the others under the k-th criterion and the performance
value of Ai is better than or equal to those of the others under the same criterion), it is
infeasible to decrease or increase this regret value. Thus there is no corresponding
feasible Ti,k j and Q values. For instance, for the example in Section 5.1, the value of r11 is
1. Thus the Q values corresponding to t1

1 j,

for j = 2, 3, and 4, are all infeasible
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(represented by =/A; not applicable). For the same reason, there are no feasible Q values
which correspond to t3 3 j, for j = 1, 2, 4 and t4 2 j, for j =1, 2, 3. Thus these entries are all
represented by =/A in Table 4.
From formula (5-7), it can be seen that rik is the geometric mean of the (m-1)
regret contributions generated when alternative Ai is compared with the other (m-1)
alternatives under the decision criterion Ck. Thus, the change in rik is an aggregated effect
of the possible changes in all these individual regret contributions. Sometimes, the DM
may want to further find out how an individual regret contribution could affect the
ranking results. By simple deduction, it can be seen that if all the other individual regret
contributions are kept the same and only one of them need to be changed, then the change
in this one should be at least as big as (m-1) times of the previously derived value so that
it could cause the ranking between two alternatives to be altered. This type of sensitivity
analysis could be too cumbersome for a large-sized decision problem and result in too
many sensitivity scenarios. However, in case it is needed for some small-sized decision
problems, a formal mathematical derivation is also presented in the next section.

6.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis in Terms of an Alternative’s Associated Pairwise Regret
Values under a Given Criterion
Similarly, suppose that the interest is to alter the ranking between alternatives Ai
and Aj and all the criteria are benefit criteria. Let r(aik, alk) represent the associated regret
of alternative Ai when comparing its performance value aik with alternative Al ’s
performance value alk under the criterion Ck, for l = 1, …, m; let bi

k l

denote the

coefficient of the change in the regret value r(aik, alk) (all the other regret values are kept
the same) such that the ranking between Ai and Aj will be altered. First, assume that
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originally Ai f Aj, then R(Ai / Aj) > 1. Let R/(Ai / Aj) denote the new ratio after the
change of r(aik, alk). The new ratio should be less than or equal to 1. It is given that
1

m

1

rik = [∏ r ( aik , a jk )]m −1 = [ r ( aik , a1k )r ( aik , a2 k )...r ( aik , alk )...r ( aik , amk )]m −1 .
j =1

Let r / (aik , alk ) = βi ,k ,l × r (aik , alk ) , then
1

m

rik/ = [∏ r (aik , a jk )] m −1
j =1

1

= [ r ( aik , a1k ) r (aik , a2 k )...r / (aik , alk )...r (aik , amk )] m −1
= [ r ( aik , a1k ) r (aik , a2 k )...β i , k ,l r ( aik , alk )...r (aik , amk )]
= ( β i , k ,l )

Let ( β i ,k ,l )

1
m −1

1
m −1

1
m −1

rik .
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From the above relation and the relation R(Ai / Aj) > 1, we can get
 Ai
A
 j

βi/,k ,l ≥ w R 
k

Then,
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 > 1.


β i , k ,l

 A
Let P =  R  i
  Aj

m −1

 A
≥ R  i

  Aj

  wk
  > 1.
 

(6-5)

m −1

  wk
  − 1 . It is now larger than 0. Then,
 

 A
r / (aik , alk ) = β i ,k ,l × r (aik , alk ) ≥  R  i
  Aj

m −1

  wk
  × r (aik , alk ) = (1 + P ) × r (aik , alk ).
 

(6-6)

From the above inequality, it can be seen that if the regret value r(aik, alk) is increased by
at least P × 100% , the ranking between Ai and Aj will be altered. Similarly, if we assume
Ai p Aj, by the same derivations as above, we can get:

β i , k ,l

 A
≤ R  i
  Aj

m −1

  wk
  < 1,
 

and

r / (aik , alk ) ≤ (1 + P) × r (aik , alk ).
 A
Now P =  R  i
  Aj


 
 

m −1
wk

− 1 < 0 , which indicates that if the regret value r(aik, alk) is

decreased by at least P × 100% , the ranking between Ai and Aj will be altered.
Using the above results, DMs could examine how changes of regret or rejoicing
values might affect the ranking results of the decision problems. It is believed that DMs
can make more careful assessments about their regret and rejoicing feelings if they can
see how sensitive the ranking results could be to the changes in these values. According
to the results of sensitivity analysis, they may want to reassess some of their anticipated
regret and rejoicing levels for better predication. Meanwhile, they can also obtain a more
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comprehensive understanding about the ranking of the alternatives and finally choose the
one that is more stable than the others.
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CHAPTER 7. ITRODUCTIO TO A FUZZY VERSIO OF THE EW
METHOD
In Chapter 3 it is proposed to use crisp numbers to represent the natural
importance of the linguistic terms for measuring regret and rejoicing. Because of the
potential impreciseness within the linguistic terms, they can also be represented by fuzzy
numbers. As pointed out in [Chen and Liao, 1996], fuzzy numbers employ a range of
values instead of one crisp number, they are more in line with the uncertainty nature of
many decision problems and the subjective nature of evaluations. The DM’s assessments
of anticipated regret and rejoicing feelings are subjective evaluations. The uncertainty
and imprecision which is inherent in their assessments of regret and rejoicing can be
accounted for by considering each of these emotional factors as fuzzy quantities,
characterized by appropriate membership functions.
Except measuring regret and rejoicing by fuzzy numbers, for some decision
problems, the performance values of the alternatives and the weights of the criteria may
also need to be expressed by fuzzy numbers. For example, sometimes it is hard to assess
precisely the performance values of the alternatives in terms of some qualitative criteria;
it could also be hard to decide the weights of the criteria because of lack of complete
information or some other potential vagueness in the decision problems. Under these
situations, the data of the decision problems may need to be evaluated by using fuzzy
numbers. With all these fuzzy data, a fuzzy version of the new method will be necessary.
The fuzzy version of the proposed method shares the same core algorithm as before
except that all the input data are fuzzy numbers and all the mathematical operations are
fuzzy operations.
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7.1 A Brief Introduction on Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Operations
Fuzzy set theory was developed for solving problems in which descriptions of
activities and observations are imprecise, vague, and uncertain [Chen and Hwang, 1992].
Fuzzy sets are sets whose elements have different grades of membership in the interval [0,
1]. A membership function which assigns to each element a grade of membership is
associated with each fuzzy set [Chen and Hwang, 1992]. Fuzzy sets were introduced by
Lotfi A. Zadeh [1965] as an extension of the classical notion of sets. In classical set
theory, the membership of elements in a set is assessed by binary values. If an element
belongs to the set, its membership will be 1. Otherwise, it will be 0. Fuzzy sets generalize
classical sets, since the indicator functions of classical sets are special cases of the
membership functions of fuzzy sets, if the latter only take values 0 or 1 [Dubois and
Prade, 1980].
A general definition of a fuzzy number is given by [Dubois and Prade, 1978; and
1980] as follows: any fuzzy subset M = {(x, uM(x))}, where x takes its number on the real
line R and uM(x) ∈ [0, 1]. The membership function denotes the degree of truth that M
takes a specific number x /. Two fuzzy numbers are equal if and only if they have the
same membership functions. There are different types of fuzzy numbers. Two widely
used are triangular type of fuzzy numbers and trapezoidal type of fuzzy numbers. Among
these two, triangular fuzzy numbers are more often used because they are simpler
compared to the more complex trapezoid fuzzy numbers. The triangular fuzzy numbers
have lower, modal, and upper values. Let A% represent a triangular fuzzy number. Its
membership function can be expressed as follows:
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(x − l)
 L
 f A% ( x) = (m − l ) , if x ∈ [l , m]

( x − u)

f A% ( x) =  f A%R ( x) =
, if x ∈ [m, u ]
−
(
m
u
)


0,
otherwise.


Where f A%L ( x) and f A%R ( x) are the left and the right spread membership functions. l, m,
and u are real numbers and l < m < u, and they stand for the lower, the modal, and the
upper values of fuzzy number A% , respectively. As represented by the above membership
function, fuzzy number A% can also be denoted as (l, m, u).
From the above description, it can be seen that fuzzy numbers are fuzzy sets
which are characterized by different membership functions. For any application involving
impreciseness and fuzziness, a vital step is the definition/generation of membership
functions associated with fuzzy concepts. In general, there are two ways to generate
membership functions. One is to define them subjectively. Interested readers may refer to
[MacVicar-Whelan, 1978; Norwich and Turksen 1984; Turksen, 1991] where some
membership function generation techniques that reflect subjective perception about vague
or imprecise concepts were discussed. There are also some data-driven membership
function generation techniques. A general overview of several methods for generating
membership functions from domain data for fuzzy pattern recognition applications can be
found in [Medasani, et al., 1998]. Since then, more methods have been developed. An
example is the fuzzy c-means variant for the generation of fuzzy term sets as developed
by Liao et al. [2003]. After the membership function for each fuzzy variable is decided
and the fuzzy data is collected, the next step is to apply the necessary operations on the
fuzzy numbers.
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Fuzzy number operations were first introduced by [Dubois and Prade, 1978; and
1980]. Let n%1 = (n1l , n1m , n1u ) and n%2 = ( n2l , n2 m , n2u ) represent two triangular fuzzy
numbers. In [Laarhoven and Pedrycz, 1983], the basic operations of triangular fuzzy
numbers are defined as follows:
(1) Addition: n%1 ⊕ n%2 = (n1l + n2 l , n1m + n2 m , n1u + n2 u )
一 n
%1 = ( − n1u , − n1m , −n1l )
(2) Negation: ○

(3) Multiplication: n%1 ⊗ n%2 = ( n1l × n2l , n1m × n2 m , n1u × n2u )
(4) Division: 1 / n%1 ≅ (1 / n1u ,1 / n1m ,1 / n1l )
For the special case of raising a triangular fuzzy number to the power of another
triangular fuzzy number, the approximation n%1n%2 ≅ ( n1l n2 l , n1m n2 m , n1u n2 u ) can be used.
After the fuzzy data are processed by the proposed new method, the final
priorities of the alternatives will also be fuzzy numbers. Since a fuzzy number represents
many possible real numbers that have different membership values, it is not easy to
compare the final ratings to determine which alternatives are preferred [Chen and Hwang,
1992]. Many fuzzy ranking methods have been developed to compare fuzzy numbers. For
some review of these methods, interested readers may refer to [Bortolan and Degani,
1985; Chen and Hwang, 1992; Chang and Lee, 1994; Dubois and Prade, 1999;
Lee-Kwang and Lee, 1999]. Under a given situation, usually people decide which method
should be used by considering the complexity of the algorithm, its flexibility, accuracy,
ease of interpretation and the shape of the fuzzy numbers which are used [Triantaphyllou,
2000]. The selection is also closely related to the application of the MCDM methods.
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7.2 A umerical Example on the Fuzzy Version of the ew Method

In this section, a similar numerical example as the one in Section 5.1 is used to
demonstrate how the fuzzy version of the proposed method can be implemented. For
simplicity, triangular fuzzy numbers are used to represent the fuzzy data in this example.
The fuzzy performance values and the fuzzy weights of the criteria come from a simple
fuzzification of the corresponding crisp data in the original example. The original crisp
data become the modals of the corresponding fuzzy data. The lower and upper parts of
the fuzzy data are constructed by choosing a certain value as the spreads of the triangular
fuzzy numbers.
In the original version of the proposed method, 9 crisp numbers are used to
represent the natural importance of the linguistic terms. For the fuzzy version of the
method, the fuzzy triangular numbers attached to the fuzzy linguistic terms will be
constructed based on them. The 9 crisp numbers are used as the modals of the
corresponding 9 triangular fuzzy numbers. For simplicity, value 1 is chosen as both the
left and the right spreads of these fuzzy numbers except for the two end values. For the
lowest linguistic term, the lower value of its associated fuzzy number should not be
smaller than the minimum value 1 of the original scale. Thus its left spread is 0 and its
lower and modal values are the same. For the highest linguistic term, the upper value of
its associated fuzzy number should not be higher than the original maximum value 9.
Then, its right spread is set to be 0 and its modal and upper values are the same. The
original linguistic terms are fuzzified to fit into the fuzzy situation. After all the above
adjustments, the fuzzy linguistic terms and the triangular fuzzy numbers attached to them
are as follows:
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Table 5. A fuzzy scale for the fuzzy version of the new method.
Linguistic Expression

Fuzzy value

The feeling of regret when choosing alternative Ai over

(1, 1, 2)

alternative Aj is barely distinguishable.
The feeling of regret when choosing alternative Ai over

(2, 3, 4)

alternative Aj may be noticeable.
The feeling of regret when choosing alternative Ai over

(4, 5, 6)

alternative Aj is nearly strong.
The feeling of regret when choosing alternative Ai over

(6, 7, 8)

alternative Aj is almost very strong.
The feeling of regret when choosing alternative Ai over

(8, 9, 9)

alternative Aj is almost as strong as it can be.
The corresponding intermediate fuzzy numbers are used (1, 2, 3), (3, 4, 5),
when the decision maker feels that the best answer lies (5, 6, 7), (7, 8, 9)
between two successive fuzzy linguistic choices from the
above list of choices.

From now on, fuzzy alternatives and fuzzy criteria are denoted as Â i and Cˆ k in
order to distinguish them from their crisp version counterparts which are denoted as Ai
and Ck. According to the previous description, the fuzzy performance values of the
alternatives under the three fuzzy criteria are as follows:
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Ĉ1

Ĉ2

Ĉ3

Â1

(18, 19, 20)

( 5,

6,

7)

(14, 15, 16)

Â 2

(14, 15, 16)

( 6,

7,

8)

( 3,

Â 3

( 3,

4,

5)

( 8,

9, 10)

(15, 16, 17)

Â 4

( 4,

5,

6)

(11,

12, 13)

( 3,

4,

4,

5)

5)

The fuzzy weights of the fuzzy criteria are:
W = [(0.25, 0.35, 0.45)

(0.32, 0.42, 0.52)

(0.13, 0.23, 0.33)];

For crisp data, the sum of weights should be equal to 1. Now it is required that the sum of
the modals of the fuzzy weights values should be equal to 1.
After replacing the original crisp regret values by the corresponding triangular
fuzzy numbers, now the simulated fuzzy pairwise regret matrix in terms of the three
criteria are as follows. The simulated fuzzy pairwise regret matrix in terms of criterion
Ĉ1 is:
Ĉ1

Â1

Â 2

Â 3

Â 4

Â1

(1, 1, 2)

(1, 1,

2)

(1, 1, 2)

(1, 1, 2)

Â 2

(2, 3, 4)

(1, 1,

2)

(1, 1, 2)

(1, 1, 2)

Â 3

(7, 8, 9)

(5, 6,

7)

(1, 1, 2)

(1, 2, 3)

Â 4

(4, 5, 6)

(3, 4,

5)

(1, 1, 2)

(1, 1, 2)
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The simulated fuzzy pairwise regret matrix in terms of criterion Ĉ2 is as follows:
Ĉ2

Â1

Â 2

Â 3

Â 4

Â1

(1, 1, 2)

(7, 8,

9)

(7, 8, 9)

(7, 8, 9)

Â 2

(1, 1, 2)

(1, 1,

2)

(2, 3, 4)

(5, 6, 7)

Â 3

(1, 1, 2)

(1, 1,

2)

(1, 1, 2)

(3, 4, 5)

Â 4

(1, 1, 2)

(1, 1,

2)

(1, 1, 2)

(1, 1, 2)

The simulated fuzzy pairwise regret matrix in terms of criterion Ĉ3 is as follows:
Ĉ3

Â1

Â 2

Â 3

Â 4

Â1

(1, 1, 2)

(1, 1,

2)

(2, 3, 4)

(1, 1, 2)

Â 2

(2, 3, 4)

(1, 1,

2)

(3, 4, 5)

(1, 1, 2)

Â 3

(1, 1, 2)

(1, 1,

2)

(1, 1, 2)

(1, 1, 2)

Â 4

(2, 3, 4)

(1, 1,

2)

(3, 4, 5)

(1, 1, 2)

For fuzzy data, the consistency tests are recommended to be applied on the modals of the
fuzzy regret values. Since the modals of the above fuzzy regret values are the crisp regret
values in the original example, they satisfy the consistency tests as examined before.
A fuzzy version of formula (4-7) is as follows:
rˆik = [

1

m

∏

rˆ(aˆik , aˆ jk )]m −1 .

j =1, i ≠ j
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(7-1)

Please note, in this formula, the fuzzy regret value produced when an alternative is
compared with itself is not counted into the computation. It is set so in case that the upper
values of the aggregated regret values are inflated improperly. By applying formula (7-1),
the fuzzy regret values of the alternatives in terms of the three criteria are as follows:
rˆik

Ĉ1

Ĉ2

Ĉ3

Â1

(1.00, 1.00, 2.00)

(7.00, 8.00, 9.00)

(1.26, 1.44, 2.52)

Â 2

(1.26, 1.44, 2.52)

(2.15, 2.62, 3.83)

(1.82, 2.29, 3.42)

Â 3

(3.27, 4.58, 5.74)

(1.44, 1.59, 2.71)

(1.00, 1.00, 2.00)

Â 4

(2.29, 2.71, 3.91)

(1.00, 1.00, 2.00)

(1.82, 2.29, 3.42)

In the above table, the entries are rˆik which is the fuzzy anticipated regret value
associated with fuzzy alternative Â i in terms of fuzzy criterion Cˆ k , for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and
k = 1, 2, 3. For example, rˆ21 = (1.26 1.44 2.52).
The fuzzy version of formula (4-9) is as follows:
n

Pˆ Jˆ
Pˆi * = i i =
Rˆi

n

∏ aˆ

wˆ k
ik

k =1

× ∏ ˆjikwˆ k
k =1

n

∏ rˆ

wˆ k
ik

n

= ∏(
k =1

aˆik ˆjik wˆ k
) , for i = 1, 2, 3, ..., m.
rˆik

(7-2)

k =1

By applying formula (7-2), the fuzzy preference values of the fuzzy alternatives are:
Pˆ1* = (1.79, 4.26, 8.91),

Pˆ2* = (1.74, 3.90, 8.67),

Pˆ3* = (1.56, 3.74, 8.44),

Pˆ4* = (1.71, 4.00, 8.18).

Next, a method that ranks fuzzy numbers based on a distance measure is used to
rank the above four fuzzy numbers. This method was introduced by Tran and Duckstein
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in [2002] where they developed a new class of distance measures for interval numbers
that takes into account all the points in both intervals and then used it to formulate the
distance measure for fuzzy numbers. Their method for ranking fuzzy numbers is based on
a comparison of the distance from fuzzy numbers to some predetermined targets: the
crisp maximum (Max) and the crisp minimum (Min). The idea is that a fuzzy number is
ranked first if its distance to the crisp maximum (Dmax) is the smallest but its distance to
the crisp minimum (Dmin) is the greatest [Tran and Duckstein, 2002]. According to the
results of some numerical examples in [Tran and Duckstein, 2002], their method
overcomes several shortcomings such as the indiscriminative and counterintuitive
behavior of several existing fuzzy ranking methods. Meanwhile, its computation process
is simple and the concept is easy to be perceived by DMs.
In this method, the Max and Min are chosen as follows:
I

I

Max( I ) ≥ sup (U s ( Ai )),

Min( I ) ≤ inf (U s ( Ai )).

i =1

i =1

In the above formulas, s (Ai) is the support of fuzzy numbers Ai, i = 1, …, I. In [Tran and
Duckstein, 2002], formulas to compute Dmax and Dmin for some of the commonly used
fuzzy numbers with two different weighting functions are also provided. Due to space
limitation, they are not described here in detail. For more detailed information, interested
readers can refer to their original paper. When the weighting function f ( α ) is set as f ( α )
= α that means more weights are given to intervals at higher α levels, applying the
Dmax and Dmin formulas for triangular fuzzy numbers to the previous four fuzzy
preference values, the intermediate results are as follows:
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f (α ) =α

P̂1*

P̂2*

P̂3*

P̂4*

Dmax

5.7932

6.1988

6.4131

6.1496

Dmin

3.8748

3.4803

3.2671

3.4914

The above results indicate that the ranking of the four fuzzy alternatives is:
Â1 f Â 4 f Â 2 f Â3 .
One can observe that this ranking is identical to that of the crisp case. To show that a
ranking method could make a difference, another method that ranks fuzzy numbers with
integral values as proposed by Liou and Wang in [1992] was also used to rank the fuzzy
numbers. When the parameter α in this method is set equal to 0.5, the ranking of the
fuzzy alternatives becomes:
Â1 f Â 2 f Â3 f Â 4 .
Though fuzzy data offer the capability to deal with imprecise information, they
may also complicate the analysis of decision problems. First, mathematical operations of
fuzzy data are not easy. This may greatly increase the mathematical computations.
Second, though there have been many (perhaps, too many) fuzzy ranking methods, it
could still be hard to clearly distinguish which fuzzy numbers (priority values) are better
or worse. As illustrated above, different ranking methods may lead to different ranking
results. Moreover, within the same method, different setting of the same parameter could
also lead to different results. Both situations could complicate the ranking of fuzzy
priority values. Then, it may be difficult to decide which alternatives should be ranked
higher and which lower. Thus, the DMs should carefully study these issues before they
decide whether to use fuzzy data and the fuzzy version of a specific MCDM method.
Please note that the fuzzy version of the proposed MCDM method can be
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accompanied with sensitivity analyses similar to ones developed for the crisp version of it.
However, as this is rather straightforward to do, it has been omitted here for brevity.
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CHAPTER 8. COCLUDIG REMARKS
In this chapter, the main contributions of the research in this dissertation and their
significance are summarized. Then, some possible future research directions are proposed
to expand the research in this dissertation.

8.1 Summary of the Research Contributions and Their Significance
In conclusion, the research in this dissertation has achieved the following main
contributions. First, a new MCDM method is proposed. Besides the usual benefit and cost
criteria, the new method is able to incorporate the effects of regret and rejoicing for
decision makers who value these emotional factors in MCDM situations. Most of the
current MCDM methods consider only the cognitive aspects of decision-making
problems and assume that the DMs are complete rational humans which are dissociated
from psychological feelings. The significance of this new model lies in that unlike those
MCDM methods, it considers the notion of regret and rejoicing and provides a better
description of human behavior in decision-making and offers the DMs the flexibility to
trade off some economic benefits explicitly in order to gain a state of psychological
satisfaction.
Second, within the new method, regret and rejoicing effects are determined by
using linguistic terms. It is regarded as more reasonable and realistic to rational human
behavior than using continuous functions. By using the linguistic terms, the DMs have
the flexibility to decide their own regret/rejoicing levels and the specific tendencies of
these feelings according to the specific situations of their decision problems. Furthermore,
the proposed approach for eliciting regret and/or rejoicing by pairwise comparisons is
flexible and adapts to the reactions of the individual DM and decision problem.
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Third, by using the multiplicative formulas to compute the final priorities of the
alternatives, the new method is immune to those rank reversal problems mentioned in the
dissertation when regret and rejoicing are not considered. Then rank reversals may occur
only as result of readjusting the effects of regret and/or rejoicing when the set of the
alternatives is altered. It is a significant property of the new method. Because some
well-known MCDM methods, like the additive AHP methods and the ELECTRE II and
III methods, suffer from the rank reversals even without the consideration of regret and
rejoicing. The effects of regret and rejoicing may be ignored if, for instance, their
presence could be considered negligible when compared to the usual performance values
of the alternatives under the benefit and cost criteria. Meanwhile, by using the
multiplicative formulas, the new method is able to deal with qualitative and quantitative
criteria expressed in different units of measurement.
Fourth, some sensitivity analysis procedures are developed for the proposed
method. Sometimes it is hard for a DM to precisely capture his/her perception of regret
and rejoicing by using a specific linguist term. Thus, it is significant and necessary to
study how changes of regret and rejoicing values could affect the ranking results of the
decision problems. It is believed that DMs can make more careful assessments about their
regret and rejoicing feelings if they can see how sensitive the ranking results could be to
the changes in these values. Another meaning of this contribution is that by using a
sensitivity analysis, the DM can obtain a more comprehensive understanding about the
ranking of the alternatives and choose the one that is more stable than the others.
Fifth, considering the potential impreciseness within the linguistic terms and the
potential vagueness in the data of some decision problems, a fuzzy version of the new
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method is also introduced. The uncertainty and imprecision which is inherent in a DM’s
assessments of regret and rejoicing can be accounted for by considering each of these
emotional factors as fuzzy quantities, characterized by appropriate membership functions.
Sometimes, the data of the decision problems may also need to be evaluated by using
fuzzy numbers. With all these potential fuzzy data, a fuzzy version of the new method is
necessary and significant. However, mathematical operations of fuzzy data may also
complicate the analysis of decision problems. Thus, the DMs should think about it
carefully before they decide whether to use fuzzy data and the fuzzy version of the new
method.
Another significant contribution is that the introduction of emotional factors
brings a new perspective to the issue of rank reversals. It was once thought that rank
reversals resulted from a method’s own mathematical artifacts are unacceptable. However,
as illustrated by the car example, strong emotional feelings like regret and rejoicing could
make a DM to change his/her preference about the alternatives unintentionally and then
change the ranking of them. The reason of rank reversals also lies in the way that regret
and rejoicing are measured. Since the feeling of regret and rejoicing comes from the
comparison of one alternative with the others, it is unavoidable that the levels of these
factors depend on the existence of other alternatives. Thus, for the new method which
incorporates these emotional factors, the occurrence of some rank reversals might be
natural and acceptable.
The main research in this dissertation has been summarized in the form of three
journal articles. As mentioned previously, one of them has been published in a refereed
journal. Another one is in print for publication also in a refereed journal. The latest one
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which is on the study of regret and rejoicing with the collaboration with Dr. Edouard
Kujawski, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, is going to be submitted for
publication to the journal of Decision Sciences very soon. These articles have also been
presented at several national and international conferences. For the details please see Part
I of the reference list.

8.2 Future Research Directions
As mentioned before, the use of a set of linguistic terms to estimate a DM’s
anticipated regret feelings is in essence a mechanism for eliciting a hidden discrete regret
function. It offers a DM the flexibility to decide the specific tendency of his/her regret
feeling based on the specific situation of his/her decision problem. However, sometimes,
some DMs may not be able to clearly capture the tendency of their perception of regret
and rejoicing. Thus, in the future, some shapes of discrete functions may need to be
developed to model some general situations of humans’ perception of regret and rejoicing.
These functions should be able to capture the realistic tendencies for most of the rational
humans’ perception of these emotional feelings. Except this possible direction, as with
other aspects of decision making, other scales could be employed to quantify the
linguistic terms and replace the original nine evenly distributed integer values. For
example, exponential values [Lootsma, 1999] might be more applicable for situations
where there is evidence that regret and rejoicing feelings vary by a certain geometric
progression factor.
Undoubtedly, emotions and feelings are indispensable factors in humans’
decision-making activities. More research is needed in this fascinating area. A long march
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of my research in this area has lead to the completion of this dissertation. However, this is
not the end but just the beginning.
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